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
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ECONOMY

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

AUTOMATION SHORTFALL IN HEAVY INDUSTRY NOTED

West Berlin IWE TAGESDIENST in German 4 Mar 86 p 2

[Article datelined Berlin 4 Mar 86: "Considerable Lag in Automation of GDR Heavy Industry"]

[Text] The East Berlin journal ARBEIT UND ARBEITSRECHT [not available for reference] has acknowledged that the level of automation in factories and combines of the GDR is "far" below the average for the metalworking industry in general. The previously dominant "single-purpose automation" has reached limits which are increasingly difficult to surpass. The article stated that only flexible automation could increase the level of automation and productivity significantly in the future. According to the journal, errors had been made in the past, especially in the installation of industrial robots in GDR heavy industry. Frequently it had not been taken into account that the installation of robots required a rethinking and frequently a revamping of the entire technological process. Despite the installation of robots, their integration into the total production process is as yet inadequate, so that frequent manual manipulation of work pieces is necessary. Moreover, important monitoring functions and diagnostic systems have not been automated. In general, too little thought had been given to new areas of application for robots. The article attributed this, among other reasons, to the GDR manufacturers' inadequate production lead and the consequent failure to afford appropriate robotics technology. The journal emphasized that it was important for GDR heavy industry to catch up with international developments in assembly process automation. It claimed that the automation level of assembly processes in the leading industrial nations will rise from 20 percent to 30 percent by 1990.

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1 May 1986

ECONOMY

POLAND

NEW DOMESTIC CREDIT REGULATIONS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (REFORMA GOSPODARCZA supplement) in Polish No 70,
27 Feb 86 p 1

[Article by Leszek Urbanowicz, vice-chairman of the Polish National Bank: "The Bank's Intentions: How To Read Credit Regulations"]

[Text] On 1 April 1986, the chairman of the Polish National Bank introduced a new credit regulation, number 1/86, titled "Principles and procedure for granting credit to state-owned businesses".

This year, as in every other year, the bank chairman has prepared the "General credit policy for 1986" and sent them out to the various departments. The actual text has been published in the present issue of REFORMA GOSPODARCZA.

The two documents named above supplement each other. The general credit policy defines the goals and credit procedures for the bank while the credit instructions form are the implement to be used and the set of regulations to be followed by both parties to a credit agreement.

The goal of the general credit system is efficient management of credit on both a macroeconomic (i.e. the entire national economy) and a microeconomic (in individual firms) scale. This goal is supposed to be achieved by the creation of favorable finance conditions for firms that are well-operated and carrying out efficient investment activities. The criterion to be used for judging their efficiency is the financial results of their activities and credit ability measured in terms of the amount of debt that they can afford to pay off.

Well-run, efficient companies will be able to count on receiving credits within amounts that they can properly manage. The banks will support those firms that are planning to restructure their operations and especially those that intend to increase their export sales, modernize their equipment and introduce energy- and material-saving technologies. Companies realizing these goals will be able to count on favorable credit terms (credit input on a level matching their ability to pay off the debt).

Credit Instructions Number 1/86 are in principle a modification of Number 1/84 which was changed in the middle of 1985. The present modification makes allowances for certain meritorious changes and necessary redefinition of certain provisions. The modified credit system is aimed at expanding upon and improving provisions established as early as 1985 and supplemented by experience since that time. The general direction taken by these provisions tends to give credit preference to efficiently-managed companies and to increase the credit requirements applied to poorly-managed companies.

The more important changes made in Number 1/86 are stated below.

1. The criterion for credit ability is the level of financial efficiency (profits or losses) determining whether or not the credit can be repaid with interest. This means that the definition of credit ability no longer includes any value or immeasurable concepts of management efficiency (paragraph 9).

2. A principle was established by which a plant (authorized in accordance with legal statutes on the negotiation of credits) that is part of a company owning several plants can use credits paid off by the firm's central development fund under the condition that the company guarantee the given plant that it will provide the money necessary to pay off these credits (paragraph 24).

3. Regulations on actions concerning state-owned companies with no credit ability have been closely coordinated with the provisions of the upgraded law on improvement of the management of state-owned businesses and its bankruptcy. Furthermore, the regulations of the instructions have been supplemented with information about the legal basis for making the granting of credit subject to a real program for improving the management of establishments other than state-owned firms (paragraphs 26-31).

4. There have been introduced principles for action in granting credits to businesses under commissary management which have been up to now regulated by separate dispensation of the chairman of the Polish National Bank (paragraphs 32-36).

5. The principle has been established that businesses receiving annual credit on a permanent basis may not have this credit postponed to the next year or substitute it for converted credit if they lose their credit ability (paragraph 54).

6. The maximum period for which development credit (both for an increase in resources connected with development as well as for an increase in the value of resources made available by a price increase) may be awarded has been changed to 5 years, counting from the date on which the credit agreement was made (paragraph 59).

7. It has been accepted in principle that credit for taxes can be granted up to the amount of the full tax liability and this calls for a reduction of the amount of this credit by so-called finance margins in cases in which the granting of credit to the full value of proper taxes would make it possible

for the given firm to finance itself with the margins of improper active funds. This furthermore makes it possible to flexibly set dues as an object of credit with regard to the specific conditions of company activity (paragraph 73).

8. All payments that in accordance with monetary payments regulations can be paid off with the help of ordered payment are to be regarded as privileged payments, i.e. those that are still covered in case of a lack of funds from credit of payment (paragraph 97).

In accordance with the directives for credit policy in 1986, the bank will adopt a policy of selective credit as expressed by the following:

-- favorable credit granted to companies with credit ability and which undertake the realization of enterprises connected with economic growth in preferred areas;

-- aid given to those firms that take effective action to revitalize their management;

-- limitation of access to credit and even total withdrawal of credit support to firms that have lost their credit ability and fail to negotiate its restoration.

The most important terms and provisions of the directives are as follows:

1. Statement of the areas of business activity enjoying credit preferences (article 3).

2. Recommendation of deeper analysis of the activity of poorly-managed firms threatened with a loss of credit ability as well as rigorous application of legal provisions on such companies (articles 5-9).

3. Recommendation to change annual credits for permanent needs to converted credit in cases in which the given firm's financial situation permits this (article 19).

4. Authorization to renegotiate the level of partial payments and payment schedules for converted credit in firms that receive such credit if their financial situation will not permit the negotiation and payment of development credit contracted to finance a growth in the amount of resources which has been caused by a price increase (paragraph 20).

5. Making it possible for commercial businesses to finance their operations using annual credit for permanent needs and any increase in resources caused by their expansion (article 22).

6. More closely tying the amount of credit for taxes to the changing liabilities of the object of this credit by recommending the awarding of credit for shorter periods and renouncing the establishment of proper taxes to the level of their average liability, etc. (article 24).

7. Preferential treatment in the granting of development credit for needs associated with the growth of certain activities of small enterprises (article 26).

8. Quantitative and qualitative expansion of credit offers for investments of businesses as expressed:

a) In the possibility of bank-credit financing of 80 percent of the costs of these investments and as much as 90 percent in cases in which the investments are connected with the introduction of advanced technology, growth of the food-industry complex, growth of consumer services (especially in new housing settlements), the management of property obtained from renounced investments as well as improved working conditions and environmental protection;

b) Mitigation of credit payment terms by making it possible to extend the payment period to the length of the entire period of economically justified operation of investment property or even to a period calculated on the basis of average amortization rates.

9. Bank departments have been given greater powers to extend credit for company investments. They may provide up to one billion zlotys of credit for investments of estimated value. Credit may be granted for the purchase of finished investment goods or for investments that involve construction work. At the same time, the criteria for credit for larger company investments and therefore those involving development and growth have been made much stricter and the Credit Committee of the chairman of the Polish National Bank is responsible for evaluating and selecting which investments will be financed.

The Credit Committee is supposed to fulfill an advisory function and its evaluations are supposed to be objective reports on the expansion plans of companies including those that are part of the directions set by the national social and economic plan and the central yearly plan or determined by changes in the structure of state planning. If business demand for credit exceeds the amounts set by credit planning, criteria such as the length of the investment cycle and the entire period of investment credit financing (i.e. the realization of investments and the paying off of credits), financial efficiency of investments (in relation to production investments) and the amount of company-owned resources used to finance an investment are all used to evaluate and determine where credit will be extended.

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ECONOMY

POLAND

POLONIA FIRMS PROFILED IN PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL

Wroclaw CZASOPISMO GEOGRAFICZNE in Polish No 3-4, 1985 pp 365-377

[Article by Barbara Manikowska, Roman Matykowski and Tadeusz Stryjakiewicz, Institute of Social and Economic Geography and Regional Planning, Poznan: "Locational Tendencies and the Regional Structure of Polonia Firms in Poland"]

[Excerpts] General Characteristics of the Activity of Polonia Firms in Poland

Foreigners (legally and physically foreign) have had legal opportunities to create businesses in Poland since 1976. However, a pronounced growth in this type of business took place after 1980. In 1983, 491 Polonia firms were active throughout Poland. About 30,000 persons or about 0.2 percent of everyone employed in the national economy and 0.6 percent of those employed in nonsocialized sectors worked in these firms (for comparison, skilled crafts employed about 6.6 percent of those working in the nonsocialized sectors). The value of the products and services of Polonia firms in 1983 amounted to 44.5 billion zlotys which is barely 0.25 percent of the total value of goods and services produced by the entire economy. In terms of the value of goods and services produced, the highest percentage of the total came from Warsaw Municipal Province (27.4 percent of the total value in goods and services produced by Polonia firms), Poznan Province (20 percent), Bielsko-Biala Province, Lodz Municipal Province and Krakow Municipal Province. Warsaw Province also took the lead in the number of persons employed (25 percent), followed by Lodz (13 percent) and Poznan (10 percent). These three provinces together contain nearly half of all employees of Polonia firms.

The size and organizational structure of Polonia firms. The size structure of Polonia firms is characterized by a predominance of small firms that employ less than 200 persons (95 percent of all Polonia firms). Those that employ 200-300 persons make up 4.1 percent while the largest ones with over 300 employees make up barely 0.9 percent.

Analysis of the organizational structure of Polonia firms shows an slightly greater percentage (56.3 percent) of single-establishment firms. Of the remaining 247 multi-establishment businesses, 10.8 percent are found in a single location, 18.4 percent are in two locations, 8.5 percent are spread out over three and 6 percent have more than three locations.

Structure by type of goods and services. Polonia firms are quite varied in the types of goods and services they provide. For lack of other data, the profile of their business activity has been based on analysis of the frequency at which certain types of business activity occur. From what this analysis has shown, 32 percent of these firms are involved in or provide services for the clothing industry, 19 percent come under the chemical industry, 11 percent are in the timber industry, 11 percent in the leather industry, 8 percent in textiles, 8 percent in metal industries, 7 percent in precision instruments and 6 percent are involved in the food industry. About 10 percent of Polonia firms are involved in construction and construction repair work.

A characteristic of these firms is the fact that they are involved in many different branches of industry. The firms are also very flexible in the types of business they conduct and often change their production as much as they can under the terms of their licensing. This makes them more able to adapt to changes in Poland's economic situation. As of 15 March 1984, 74.5 percent of the registered Polonia firms in Poland were involved in more than one branch of production. Out of these, the following had very diverse business profiles:

a) Alpha (with headquarters in Krakow), manufacturing zippers, tourist and sports equipment (sailboats), products cast from nonferrous metals and other metal products for industry, plastic-molding machines and equipment, industrial automation and control systems, computer parts, electronic devices, standard parts and components for the electronic products and also providing services for ETO [expansion unknown] machinery and equipment, wire telecommunications devices, services for the production of magnetic recording tape and the sale of zippers;

b) Comindex with headquarters in Warsaw, involved in the canning of fruits and vegetables, the manufacture of plastic articles, cosmetics and perfumes, laundry products, pastes, lubricants, glues and pharmaceutical preparations, the creation and processing of fodder mixtures and concentrates, fodder flours and animal husbandry products, the manufacture of domestic glassware, decorative glassware and crystal, food and confectionery concentrates, rabbit breeding and rabbit furs and the production of clothes and leather goods from its own livestock.

Among the Polonia firms, one also finds specialized (single-industry) firms but their percentage is much lower (about 25.5 percent of the total). Typical single-industry businesses are: a) Fly in Krakow (manufacturing sport and fishing equipment); b) Corpol in Sierpiec (bottle caps); c) Mazur-Tom in Olsztyn (nails); d) Slik in Czestochowa (Christmas tree ornaments) and e) Videofilmpol in Warsaw (production of educational and propaganda films and film and television services). A considerable portion of the single-industry businesses are clothing firms.

Regional structure. According to the location of their company headquarters, the regional structure of Polonia firms in Poland is shown in figure 1. We have used the number of firms registered before 15 March 1984 as the measure of their concentration and basis for analysis. They are found in almost all

provinces except 9. More than half (51.5 percent) of them are located in provincial cities, 24.6 percent in remaining cities and 23.9 percent in rural centers. In 10 provinces (such as in Bielsko-Biala, Opole, Slupsk and Tarnow provinces), Polonia firms are found just in the cities whereas in Siedlce, Suwalki and Sieradz provinces, they are located only in the rural areas.

The greatest center for Polonia firms is Warsaw which has 116 (20.5 percent) of them. After Warsaw, the next largest centers are Poznan (5.7 percent), Krakow (4.6 percent), Lodz (4.4 percent), Gdynia (2.3 percent), Bielsko-Biala (2.0 percent), Wroclaw (1.8 percent), Zielona Gora (1.2 percent), Gdansk (1.1 percent) and Torun (1.1 percent). Therefore, the greatest centers of Polonia business are the provincial capitals of macroregional functions. Out of the 10 largest centers of Polonia business, there is only one city that does not fulfill macroregional functions (Gdynia). The greatest rural centers, each containing 5 firms, are the Lomianki and Michalowice communities in Warsaw province. We must point out that nearly half of all Polonia firms are found in 227 communities of the 16 largest centers (each containing 5 or more such firms).

Regionally speaking, the greatest concentration of Polonia firms is in Warsaw province, which contains 33.8 percent of all of them, followed by Poznan (9.4 percent), Lodz (6.0 percent), Krakow (5.1 percent), Gdansk (4.8 percent) and Katowice (4.1 percent) and therefore the provinces with large urban and industrial centers. A considerable concentration is also found in the neighboring provinces to the large centers: Skierniewice (3.2 percent), Ciechanow (2.5 percent), Siedlce (2.1 percent) and Bielsko-Biala (2.1 percent).

Types of Foreign Trade Ties

The regional foreign ties of Polonia firms is strongly influenced by the territorial origin of their owners (figure 2). The strongest ties are with West Germany because 23 percent of business owners are from that country. Another characteristic of the regional structure of owner origins is the considerable diversity of their foreign ties which aside from the countries of Europe and North America include Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, India, Afghanistan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Argentina, Venezuela and Australia. One's attention is drawn by the "originality" of some of the mixed international connections such as Monaco and Great Britain or Canada and Switzerland.

The owners of Polonia firms also include citizens of socialist states such as Yugoslavia (two), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the People's Republic of China (all of which are represented by one firm).

The territorial origin of owners is also reflected in the regional structure of the international trade conducted by the firms. In both export and import, West Germany has a dominant role and the value of total trade by Polonia firms with that country amounted to 11.5 million dollars in 1983 with imports exceeding exports by half a million dollars. The other chief recipients of Polonia products are Holland, Austria, West Berlin and Sweden. The assortment

of exported products mostly consists of fruits, wooden products and chemical products.

Among the countries with which the Polonia firms have the most highly-developed import trade are (aside from West Germany) Sweden, Great Britain, Holland, the United States and Italy (all of which were involved in over one million dollars worth of trade in 1983). A smaller level of import business is conducted with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Argentina, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Korea and China. About 75 percent of import trade involves raw materials and materials (chiefly food and chemical products) as well as machinery and instruments. Textiles are also an important import trade item.

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1 May 1986

ECONOMY

YUGOSLAVIA

QUESTION OF ELIMINATING ENTERPRISE ACCOUNTS DISCUSSED

Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Mar 86 pp 12-14

[Article by T. Dumezic: Do Not Eliminate Individual Accounts"]

[Text] The operational plan for measures to achieve financial consolidation, enacted by the Federal Executive Council, provides for another change to Article 146 of the Associated Labor Act. The proposal is to introduce the requirement that basic organizations must conduct their financial transactions through a single work organization account (so that allotment of workers' personal incomes is not endangered). Remember back: Article 146 of the Associated Labor Act required that every work organization have its own account; then approximately two years ago, this requirement was eliminated--basic organizations could do business through their own accounts or through the work organization account; now the proposal is in the works that basic organization accounts be eliminated. Why?

As there can be no doubt about the good intentions of our state representatives, there exists just one answer: by eliminating the external accounts of basic organizations, they hope to bring about a more rational use of money in the economy, higher liquidity, and a decrease in short-term credit and interest costs. But good intentions are no guarantee for good results. In this case it would not be difficult to prove that the results, in a broader context, will be negative. Savings will be at an even lower level than they are now. In addition, if the anticipated results are debatable, the proposal's proponents do not ask themselves why this is the case--why in this two year period has such a negligibly small number of basic organizations decided to eliminate their own accounts and conduct their financial transactions through a single work organization account? It would not in any way be right if we have arrived at the point where our state representatives think they know more about how to optimally maximize the economic interests of those employed in organizations, than those employed in the organizations themselves. Such an idea is a denial of reality. The entire Yugoslav economy can be viewed as one enterprise where the state is the executive and managerial arm. Its impact in this light, is not favorable.

Funds Will Not Grow

It is a fact that the economy's organizations, as a whole, all total have approximately 15 percent of their own funds for financing on-going production

costs (for covering durable working capital). As a result, they turn to credit, then interest, not to mention the high inflation, which weighs upon the price of the cost of production and services which in turn contributes to accelerating inflation.

Interest payments last year (the actual figures are still not known) amounted to over 1,700 billion dinars. Economic organizations probably earned approximately 650 billion dinars from this interest in the last year. This indicates that a number of organizations at times possess a significant quantity of unencumbered funds, that these organizations use these funds rationally, and that they earn a significant income as a result. A separate issue is that of the inadequate system for accounting total revenue and earnings, because revenue from interest, even though in the regulations it is less percentage-wise than the inflation rate, is treated as revenue earned in current business. It is an integral part of total revenue and earnings, so it can also be allocated. Such an accounting method is flawed, because interest up to the rate of inflation is not revenue, because it allows only for the maintenance of real currency value.

Precisely because of this flawed accounting system, the earnings shown in an organization's ledgers are incorrect (higher). From this it follows that a part of the economy's financial capital is allocated as current earnings, which means that economic organizations remain without their own funds to finance their current business. In the past 8 years the part of durable working capital financed by an organization's own resources has fallen approximately 50 percent; 15 percent in total financing. Consolidating the financial transactions of basic organizations through the account of the work organization could eventually lead to a decrease in the economy's expenses (based on the 1985 situation) of approximately 200 billion dinars. From a statistical standpoint, the earnings from interest of those organizations which allocate unencumbered financial resources would be decreased by the same amount. Thus a certain amount of redistribution is possible. But, from a dynamics standpoint, the negative effects would be overcome precisely by an interest of those employed in basic organizations in the rational use of funds.

Can the Independence of Basic Organizations of Associated Labor (BOAL's) be Preserved?

The elimination of individual accounts of basic organizations should not permit the curtailment of the independence of workers in basic organizations in terms of the allocation of earnings, according to the FEC position. It need not be demonstrated that if a worker does not allocate funds, then he for all practical purposes has no decision making power over anything else. In such a case, basic organizations would no longer be either an economic subject, or an object for taxation purposes. Consequently, the FEC will probably offer such a solution that along with the elimination of individual accounts of basic organizations, will also reinforce the duty of basic organizations to conduct their own internal accounting. How will this differ from the present situation?

The number of external individual accounts of organizations of associated labor registered with the social accounting service is approximately 30 thousand. Their number certainly could be cut in half. What savings would be achieved? It certainly would not result in a significant increase in the payment expenses because the number of people employed by the state accounting service would not be cut accordingly. On the other hand, expenses incurred by work organizations, certainly would be greater. Internal accounts records presupposes a different financial service, and more people hired to do the job. One technical problem would certainly arise, a part of the deposits to the account would not be immediately identified, which would lead to more work and expenses connected with clearing up such transactions.

In this context changes would be more technical in nature. Nothing essentially would be achieved by them, except that work organization expenses would go up. Consequently, the real motive for this change surely lies elsewhere. Let us say that the real motive is the rational use of funds. Is it not possible for this to be achieved when external individual basic organization accounts exist? Basic organizations currently can (and the majority of them do) arrive at agreements on mutual credit which can also be interest free.

In essence, under the guise of financial consolidation of the economy, they want to strengthen work organizations through the forced centralization of funds. Although we concur that the economic strengthening of work organizations is an understandable goal, we must state that this method is far from any kind of economics. Work organizations which were formed by the association of basic organizations (and therefore, the association of resources of these organizations) may have their business subjectivity, partially through the interrelation of the work processes, but primarily on the basis of common resources--bearing the risks for those employed in the work organization (earnings and losses) which result from the profitability of the use of the resources.

The fact that there exists a number of basic organizations, in particular involved in partial production, which have no claims to the external market, which could not even exist on the external market, does not have to be tied into any kind of connection with individual basic organization accounts. This is a question of coordinating internal organization with rational principles. This coordination should be accelerated, but not conducted by government organs. The state's job is to discover economic systemic solutions which will contribute to as broad and concrete a transfer of risks as possible from those employed in organizations; the job of those employed in enterprises is to organize themselves in the way which best suits them. No one can know this better than the workers themselves in the individual organizations.

12788/12828
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POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MODELS OF COMMUNIST CONSTITUTIONS EXAMINED

Munich SUEOSTEUROPA in German No. 1, 1986 pp 1-32

[Article by Prof Dr Georg Brunner, professor of East Law and Public Law and director of the Institute for East Law at Cologne University]

[Text] With the help of God and the West, the number of communist systems of different cultures and societies has grown to 16. Another explanation of their creation is hard to imagine for all of them have in common merely the fact that according to Marxist ideology a socialist revolution should not have been permitted to occur. As a rule there was no developed capitalism with a strong proletariat in these countries, which should have been necessary according to the ideological premises and in the few cases in which the existence of the social conditions necessary for the revolution could seriously be taken into consideration (e.g. Central and East Germany, Czechoslovakia) the communist assumption of power was not the result of a revolution from within but was caused from the outside, i.e. as a consequence of the conquest by a foreign power. As a result, it is no wonder that the countries condemned by fate of reaching a certain stage of socialism differ in many ways after decades of communist rule. This applies especially to the constitutional order within the broader framework of the political system.

Communist Political Systems

Viewed from the West, communist political systems--notwithstanding the debates of the scholars--are to be designated as more or less totalitarian dictatorships. In the mirror of their own ideology they appear--apart from the Soviet Union, which is said to have already passed through this stage of development--as dictatorships of the proletariat. Nevertheless both points of view do not exclude differences among the various communist dictatorships. This is demonstrated by just a look into the traditional comparativist textbooks on both sides, whereby the political scientists of the West¹ as a rule choose the "country-by-country approach," i.e. a separate description of the individual countries, while the constitutional lawyers of the East² more frequently prefer a comprehensive integrally comparative description.

Whether these dictatorships are totalitarian or proletarian, the holder of political power does require definition. According to Lenin's doctrine and the explicit statements of the communist constitutions of the second generation³,

the supreme leadership in the political system is assigned to the communist party. Most Western scholars agree with the conclusion that communist systems constitute one-party dictatorships with the proviso that "party" is to be understood to signify the party leadership which exercises its rule by its functionaries--merely about 3 percent of the party members. However, it would be inappropriate to hastily follow the "prevailing opinion." A look into the past and present of communist dictatorships teaches us that by their nature--to speak in the terminology of Aristotle--they can be tyrannical or oligarchic. Both forms obey completely different rules of political power.

In the first variant of the one-man dictatorship, the old "divide et impera" rule prevails. The party is degraded to one of several instruments of power, which are at the disposal of the dictator and whose importance can change. A classical example of these facts is the Stalinist system which dominated the scene until the mid-fifties and survived unchanged in Albania until the death of Enver Hoxha in April 1985. According to the Stalinist model, party, state machinery, secret police, and military fundamentally are means of equal values but no holders of the power. At present, the systems of Romania, North Korea, Cuba, and perhaps Bulgaria are to be labeled as tyrannies. In comparison with the Stalinist system, as a new special feature the effort of the dictator is frequently observed to strengthen his power base through the family clan under revival of old national traditions. This trend is felt most clearly in Romania and North Korea, where N. Ceausescu and Kim Il-song, according to the principle of "rotation of the cadres," have occupied more and more positions with their relatives⁴ and try to establish a dynasty by having their sons recognized as legitimate successors.

The conditions for a one-party dictatorship are present only in the case of an oligarchy. Nevertheless caution is indicated even in this case. By its nature an oligarchy consists of some (competing) groups, whereby not everyone of these groups necessarily has to be rooted in the party. In times of "collective leadership," the party leadership may be merely a coalition of leaders representing various power structures. Certain features of an oligarchical rule, that emerged during the Brezhnev era led to interpreting the Soviet system in the sense of "institutionalized pluralism."⁵ Furthermore the role played by the military in the communist systems must not be overlooked. For historical and political reasons, the communist party and the military in all east and southeast Asian states and in Cuba are so linked with one another that the question of "who controls whom" is hard to answer even now. In times of domestic unrest--when the party apparatus breaks down and the military remains as the sole stable force--even a military dictatorship is possible. Such trends could be observed in China during the second phase of the "cultural revolution" and led in Poland to open military rule in December 1981. Even though the state of emergency was lifted in July 1983, and the Military Council of National Salvation was dissolved, the party dictatorship could not be restored in Poland, for the rebuilding of the party apparently meets with difficulties that are hard to overcome. The present political system can be described as a military-bureaucratic oligarchy, as long-term products of military dictatorships with a one-party system usually are in many Third World states.

It can be assumed that the differences among the political systems outlined above are expressed in the constitutional regulations on state power. This

article is to clarify whether they also entail different models of constitutions.

General Features of the Constitutional Structure

In the course of the developments of the constitutions since the early sixties⁶, it has been generally customary in the communist countries to include in the constitution relatively clear references to the political system in general and the leading role of the party in particular. As a consequence, communist constitutions reflect only a part of the political power structure, namely the part of political power which the holder of the supreme power delegates to the state to execute it. To be able to bring out different models of the constitution, it is recommended to determine the state organ to which the state power is primarily assigned according to the constitution.

For this purpose it is not enough to examine the 15 constitutions now in force and their predecessors.^{7,8} In addition to the norms of the material constitutional law, the constitutional reality is to be carefully kept track of on account of the --well known-- limited norms of communist constitutions. The actual constitution can only be discovered if legal and political analyses are properly combined.

According to the texts of the constitutions, the supreme state power is to be concentrated everywhere in an assembly which is elected directly by the people and in a few states indirectly (Yugoslavia since 1974, PRC, Cuba, Laos). However, in reality "socialist parliaments" constitute the most unimportant part of the constitutional order. This applies even to those countries in which some activity of the parliament can be discerned (Yugoslavia, Poland) or parliamentary elections make possible a degree of personal alternative (Hungary since 1967 optional and since 1985 compulsory, Poland since 1985).⁹ Undoubtedly some differences in the operation of the organs of the assembly exist, but a differentiation between an organizationally-managing and a "legislative"¹⁰ type is an exaggeration that is not justified. The picture of an "assembly government," which feigns the principle of "unit of powers"--of whatever kind--has no basis in political reality.

In addition to the supreme organ of state power, all constitutions provide at least two organs that appear suitable for an effective exercise of state power. The first is a government organ in the technical sense, which mostly but not in all cases is called "council of ministers."¹¹ Constitutional systems in which the most important holder of state power is the government, are to be designated with the term "council of ministers model." Furthermore, in all constitutional orders a collegial organ is present, which has various designations and fulfills different functions. But as a rule it has at least the task of acting as a "substitute parliament" in the time between the rare meetings of the assembly organs. Because of its function as a substitute parliament, this body is frequently designated as a "presidium"¹² or a "standing committee"¹³ of the assembly organ concerned.¹⁴ When the power is concentrated in this body, the term "state council" is mostly used. For this reason we are going to apply the term "state council model"¹⁵ to designate such a constitutional power structure.

However, the fact should not be overlooked that official designations merely represent an indicator and no proof of competence. Regardless of the traditional

dogma of the "collective head of state" in connection with the function as substitute parliament, the institution of a single president is not unknown to the communist systems. At present six states have a monocratic head of state, even though he may not always bear the title of "president."¹⁶ If the president is the most important holder of power in the state, then we are dealing with a "presidential model."

Before a detailed description of the models of the individual constitutions is provided, it should also be noted that other constitutional organs are present, too. But they are not to be characterized as centers of power. This applies especially to the supreme court and the chief public prosecutor as well as the Yugoslav constitutional court that has been in existence since 1963 and the special institutions for constitutional control recently established in Hungary and Poland. More attention should be paid to the various defense councils and similar bodies which have been established in numerous countries during the past two decades. Their constitutional competences and their political importance vary greatly and they deserve a more thorough study. At least in the countries in which they are placed constitutionally on the same level with the council of ministers, they can play an important role in the field of defense policy. Moreover, they have been assigned considerable emergency powers, so that the competences of the government are reduced.¹⁷

The Council of Ministers Model

The council of ministers constitution is the traditional type of communist state organization. The 1936 Stalinist constitution can be regarded as its classical embodiment even though the constitutions of the RSFSR of 1918 and of the USSR of 1924 established this type. The fundamental difference, which in this connection is not important, consists in that the first Soviet constitutions had two assembly organs (Soviet congress, central executive committee), while the 1936 constitution made do with only one assembly organ (Supreme Soviet). In addition, all Soviet constitutions established a government organ (Council of People's Commissars, since 1946 Council of Ministers) and a collegial presidential organ (Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, since 1936 Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). Mongolia immediately imitated this model as the first Soviet satellite state.¹⁸ After World War II, the first East European constitutions followed the Stalinist model. This entailed the abolition of the traditional monocratic head of state in Yugoslavia (1946), Albania (1946), Bulgaria (1947), Romania (1948), Hungary (1949), and Poland (1952). The Czechoslovak (1948) and the East German (1949) constitutions were exceptions insofar as they adhered to the traditional institution of the state president. With the 1953 Law on the Constitution, Yugoslavia soon returned to this institution. Outside Europe, only the North Korean constitution of 1948 followed the Soviet model without restriction, while all other systems had some special constitutional features from the start.

The Importance of the Council of Ministers

Whether a constitutional order represents a council of ministers constitution cannot be determined by the text of the constitution alone. The reason for that is primarily ideological in nature: The principle of "unity of powers" and the fictional omnipotence of the assembly organ cause the constitutions to

describe the council of ministers, which merely executes and decrees, as the "supreme organ of the state administration," and therefore to circumscribe its competences quite narrowly. Under certain circumstances more revealing hints can be found in the norms of material constitutional law, especially the law on the council of ministers--if there is such a law.¹⁹ Sometimes the synonymous use of the term "government" indicates the increased importance of the council of ministers.

The current importance of the councils of ministers can only be determined by careful analysis of the constitutional reality, which thus far has only been carried out with respect to the Soviet Union²⁰ and the GDR²¹. Even though we do not know a great deal about the activity of the individual councils of ministers, the council of ministers by its nature has an indisputable advantage over all other constitutional organs: It consists of the chiefs of the individual administrative departments which, on the one hand, possess a great deal of expertise and, on the other hand, an administrative apparatus. Knowledge and organization are important sources of power. Whether the council of ministers can make use of this power base to develop by way of the role of a mere coordinator of the state administration to a government which makes political decisions is, however, doubtful. In the constitutional reality, the leadership competence of the councils of ministers with regard to the fields of the economy, of social and cultural affairs, and possibly of jurisprudence is restricted, while for fundamental decisions in the fields of foreign, defense and security policy, the top bodies of the party are competent, which also directly guide the corresponding state administrative authorities--circumventing the council of ministers.²² But what is involved hereby are matters which are taken away per se from the state power. Consequently their absence cannot detract from the fundamental assumption for a council of ministers constitution.

From these statements it should not be concluded that in a council of ministers constitution the council of ministers in its entirety is necessarily the supreme holder of power. As a rule, communist councils of ministers are much too big to be viable as such. The number of their members is mostly between 30 and 60 and the Soviet council of ministers even consists of more than 100 members. For this reason in most councils of ministers a smaller group of 10-15 persons has developed over time, which later on has found recognition in some constitutions under the designation of "presidium."²³ This cabinet-like body functions as managing and deciding core of the government.²⁴ It is headed by a chairman who as chief of government controls the entire state apparatus and can treat his colleagues as his subordinates even though formally he is neither designated as prime minister nor possesses his powers.

Development of the Council of Ministers Constitution

The council of ministers constitution stands out because of its great elasticity since it is practicable in a tyrannical as well as in an oligarchic structuring of the political system. In case of a one-man dictatorship, the party chief can assume the chairmanship in the council of ministers either himself or he can assign it to a follower to get a hold of the state apparatus. If the political system represents a group dictatorship, in which case the principle of "collective leadership" is emphasized, the offices of the party chief and of the government chief are occupied by different persons and this personal dualism reflects an unstable balance of powers between party and government apparatus.

The tyrannical council of ministers constitution is the original form. It was established in the Soviet Union under Lenin, who, as undisputed party chief from 1917 to 1924, also held the office of chief of government. After his death, Rykov assumed the chairmanship in the Council of People's Commissars (1924-1930), while General Secretary Stalin strengthened his control over the party apparatus. After Stalin had essentially achieved the rise to sole power, Rykov was kicked out and executed after a show trial in 1938. At first Stalin entrusted the management of the state machinery to Molotov (1930-1941), who was loyally devoted to him, until Stalin himself took over this position (1941-1953). After the communist assumption of power in Eastern Europe, the people's democracies copied this model. The personal union between party and state was embodied by Hoxha in Albania (1944-1954), Tito in Yugoslavia (1945-1953), Chervenkov in Bulgaria (1950-1954), Rakosi in Hungary (1952-1953), Bierut in Poland (1952-1954), and Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania (1952-1955). Czechoslovakia and the GDR, established in 1949, constituted special cases on account of their retention of the institution of the state president.²⁵ In the area outside of Europe at this time, the tyrannical council of ministers constitution was introduced in Mongolia by Choibalsan (1924-1952) and continued by his successor Tsedenbal (1952-1954) as well as established in North Korea by Kim Il-song (1948-1972).

After Stalin's death a violent struggle for power erupted in the Soviet Union, which was designated as "collective leadership." As a consequence, the political system changed within the framework of the existing council of ministers constitution from a tyranny to an oligarchy. The effects of this development on the states of the Soviet area of hegemony consisted in that the concentration of party and state leadership in one and the same person--symbol of the recently discovered and detested "cult of the personality"--became more and more untenable. Thus all communist dictators in the Soviet sphere of influence were faced with a difficult choice. Most of them made the correct decision and--as Khrushchev--preferred the party leadership over the state leadership. The Bulgarian Chervenkov as sole European dictator made the mistake to renounce the party leadership in 1954. During the subsequent power struggle, the party machinery proved to be the more solid power base. After 2 years, Chervenkov had to relinquish the chairmanship in the council of ministers and he also lost all other offices in 1961. The Mongolian Tsedenbal, even though he had relinquished the party leadership to Damba in 1954, had more luck. In subsequent years he succeeded in eliminating his rivals and regaining the leadership of the government. Between 1958 and 1974 he united the offices of party and government chief anew in his person. The Mongolian revival of the tyrannical council of ministers constitution, which a short time before that had still been regarded as objectionable, was made possible by events that meanwhile had taken place in the Soviet Union. In March 1958, Khrushchev had ousted Bulganin from the office of chairman of the council of ministers and thus had restored the accumulation of top offices of the late Stalin era, which was to continue until his own downfall in October 1964. In Eastern Europe only the Bulgarian Zhivkov (1962-1971) followed Khrushchev's example. The temporary union of both offices under Kadar in Hungary (1956-1958, 1961-1965) falls into another category and is to be explained by the special circumstances in connection with the suppression of the anti-communist revolution.

During Khrushchev's rule, Cuba joined the camp of the communist systems. In its initial phase prior to the adoption of the constitution of February 1976, which formally confirmed the entry into the constitutional family of the communist systems, the Cuban system developed an original variant of the council of ministers constitution by combining it with the Latin American tradition of the authoritarian presidential system. The Cuban system developed not as a result of a communist revolution but came from a victorious guerrilla movement, which, moreover, is not unknown for this region. A unity party of the Leninist type was created only after dictator Castro had the entire political power firmly in his hands. The ruling elite did without a popular representation for nearly 18 years. In the state area, there were only two organs which, according to the constitution, appointed one another: the council of ministers headed by Castro, which, among other things had full legislative power, and the state president Dorticos, whose duties were more representative in nature.

Oligarchical and Tyrannical Variants

At present half of the communist states have a council of ministers constitution, even though special features must be pointed out in most cases. As regards personal combinations, only Hungary has an oligarchical council of ministers constitution. Fundamentally the same is also true for the present China; however, because of its numerous special constitutional features, the Chinese constitutional system is treated separately later on. In Mongolia (since 1974), Albania and Poland (since 1985), the council of ministers constitution, because of the union of the offices of the party chief and of the chairman of the presidential organ, has come closer to a state council constitution without a change having formally been made in the council of ministers constitution. The same process was used by Brezhnev when he assumed the chairmanship in the presidium of the Supreme Soviet; Andropov and Chernenko followed this system, while Gorbachev again gave up this practice. In East Germany, where the state council model was born and later on was practically relinquished --in connection with Ulbricht's removal from power--in favor of the council of ministers constitution, Honecker anticipated Brezhnev's example. The uncertain constitutional situation of these states is discussed in more detail in the following section. Here only the Polish development is to be pointed out.

Up to the unconstitutional proclamation of the state of emergency (stan wojenny) of 12 December 1981, and the subsequent establishment of the military dictatorship of the Military Council of National Salvation, headed by General Jaruzelski, post-Stalinist Poland, together with Hungary, belonged to the small group of confirmed followers of an oligarchical council of ministers constitution. The state of emergency was suspended in December 1982 and lifted in July 1983, when the military council was also dissolved. Nevertheless military rule in weakened form survived under the cover of a tyrannical council of ministers constitution, in which General Jaruzelski remained first secretary of the ailing party as well as chief of the government and, moreover, in November 1983 was appointed chairman of the upgraded National Defense Committee and supreme commander of the armed forces. Two years later, Jaruzelski exchanged the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers for that in the state council to relieve himself of the administrative duties of administrative management.

At present, Laos, which did not join the communist camp until 1975, is the only country that practices a tyrannical council of ministers constitution. The political leadership lies with Kayson Phomvihane, who at the same time is general secretary of the Laotian People's Revolutionary Party and chairman of the council of ministers. At the end of 1975 when the king was forced to abdicate and the republic was proclaimed, the communist prince Souphannouvong in his capacity as chairman of a Supreme People's Assembly of obscure origin was appointed president.

China's Constitutional Order

China's constitutional order has always exhibited special features.²⁷ The development of the Chinese constitution can only be understood in view of the party history with its never-ending factional struggles between moderates and radicals. In the initial phase of the people's democracy, the supreme state power rested in the Central People's Government Council headed by the chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, whereby Mao also held the chairmanship in the important Revolutionary Military Council, while the subordinate State Administrative Council operated under Zhou Enlai's leadership. The first constitution of 1954 adapted the state organizational structure to the council of ministers model, but introduced hereby the office of the chairman of the republic, which Mao held until April 1959. Thereafter, the top offices were distributed among three persons: Mao Zedong (chairman of the CCP, chairman of the military commission of the party), Zhou Enlai (chief of government), and Liu Shaoqi (chairman of the republic, chairman of the National Defense Council, supreme commander). But it did not take long for the constitutional order to be destroyed in the widening chaos of the factional struggles, which found their culmination in the "Cultural Revolution."²⁸

In the first half of the sixties, Liu could be regarded as the second most powerful leader after Mao. The political real constitution thus assumed the features of an oligarchical presidential rule. However, the cultural revolution ended Liu's power. Since the end of 1966 Liu was no longer able to exercise his presidential office and in October 1969 his removal from office was also formally announced. As a result, the management of the remainders of the state apparatus came into Zhou's hands. However, the emerging type change to the council of ministers constitution was eclipsed by growing trends towards a military regime. The sudden and mysterious death of Defense Minister Lin Biao, who had been earmarked as Mao's deputy and successor in the constitutional draft allegedly approved in September 1970, stopped this development in the fall of 1971.

Following the successive deaths of Zhou and Mao in 1976, the factional struggles entered a new phase and ended in 1980 with the defeat of the radical wing, which was embodied by the "Gang of Four." Around this time, the neo-Maoist group headed by Hua Guofeng was already on the downgrade. This group had gained influence after Mao's death and the regulations of the 1975 and 1978 constitutions and the circumstance that Hua had taken over both of the offices of Zhou and Mao in April and September 1976, respectively, for a long time caused the appearance as if a tyrannical council of ministers constitution would develop, in which the party would enjoy priority over the state even according to the law. But Hua was gradually outmaneuvered and overpowered by Deng Xiaoping in 1980/81, who led his coalition of the moderates to victory by skillful tactics.²⁹

The formal foundations for the finally consolidated power structure were laid with the approval of new party statutes and a new constitution in 1982. The new constitution³⁰ does represent the type of a council of ministers constitution but has at the same time reintroduced the office of a head of state whose de facto abolition had been sanctioned by its predecessors of 1975 and 1978. In view of the distribution of the offices, a purely oligarchical picture develops in which the most important instruments of power are available to the leading personalities of the pragmatic reformers, namely the party apparatus to the General Secretary Hu Yaobang (since 1979 or 1980; the office of the CCP chairman was abolished in 1982), the state apparatus to Zhao Ziyang (chairman of the state council since 1980), the legislative body to Peng Zhen (chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress since 1983)--and--not to be forgotten--the military to Deng Xiaoping himself (Chairman of the Military Commission of the party since 1981 and chairman of the Central Military Commission of the state since its establishment in 1983). The more or less representative office of head of state was left to Li Xiannian, a representative of Mao's old guard.

The State Council Model

Formally the state council model, which enriches the constitutional law landscape of communism for a quarter of a century, hardly deviates from the council of ministers constitution. It, too, only knows three constitutional organs: an assembly, a government, and a collegial presidential organ whose functions are the exercise of the traditional powers of a head of state and of the substitute handling of the tasks of the parliament. At present, half of the states to be considered designate their presidential organ as "state council." The terminology is, however, no unfailing indicator for a state council constitution. For reasons as yet unexplained, Poland as a first state introduced the term "state council" (Rada Państwa), when Poland started in 1947 to imitate the traditional Soviet model by adoption of the "small constitution."³¹ However, there is no doubt that Poland never embodied the type of a state council constitution at least as of November 1985.

The history of the state council constitution started with the creation of the East German "state council" in 1960. This example was later followed by Romania (1961), Bulgaria (1971), Cuba (1976), Vietnam (1980) and Kampuchea (1981). A sure indicator of a state council constitution also cannot be found in the organization under constitutional law of the competences of the presidential organ³² even though it is usually more careful and more detailed in the case of a state council. It is amazing in this connection that the only two bodies to which formally the most far-reaching power of a general representation of parliament is granted when the latter is not in session, are not designated as "state council." What is involved here is the Hungarian presidential council. (Article 30, paragraph 5 of the constitution), and the presidium of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly (Article 58, paragraph 1 of Constitutional Law 143/1968). Decisive is solely the constitutional reality which should be thoroughly examined by the authors dealing with these problems.³³

Compared with the council of ministers, the state council is at a disadvantage from the start, for it does not possess any direct access to the state apparatus.

The latter is completely or at least in the first place subordinated to the government. To equalize this handicap, the state council can try to develop its own apparatus. Thus it could be observed that during Ulbricht's rule, the East German state council bureaucracy grew and in the late sixties achieved a staff of 400.³⁴ For the same purpose, the Romanian Ceausescu--especially in the period from 1969 to 1972--established numerous decision making, advisory and administrative bodies, which are subordinated to the state council in various ways.³⁵

Nevertheless these measures are not enough to provide the state council with the same conditions as those of the council of ministers. The power of the state council can only be a derived power which has its origin in personal factors. However, these are not related to its composition. For a more thorough and comparative analysis shows that the members of the state council are mostly chosen for the purpose of projecting the image of an honorable and respectable body which unites within itself, in addition to party and state functionaries, scientists, artists, managers, workers, and peasants. The sole possible source of the remaining secondary power is the chairman himself, who transfers to the state council his power rooted in another position. Therefore a functioning state council constitution requires the union of the chairman of the state council with the office of the party chief and thus is admirably suitable for a tyrannical power structure. Undoubtedly the situation can change in the course of time and produce special cases. The latest example of Vietnam even shows that a state council constitution can also be introduced under oligarchical conditions.

State Council Constitution in Historical Perspective

In historical perspective, the state council constitution was first introduced in the GDR in September 1960 after the death of W. Pieck, the president of the republic. Under the prevailing circumstances it did not appear appropriate for W. Ulbricht, the SED first secretary, to assume the succession of W. Pieck nor to oust O. Grotewohl from the office of chief of government. He found a suitable solution in the creation of a completely new constitutional organ--of the state council. Aside from the additional safeguarding of the position of power of the party chief in the state sphere, its advantage consisted in the possibility to represent the state internally and externally, to act as a statesman and father of the people without being excessively burdened with the conduct of the affairs of state.

How much the preeminence of the state council depends on the cited personal union has been clearly proved by the events during Ulbricht's removal from power. In May 1971 Ulbricht was forced to relinquish his office of SED first secretary. To preserve the semblance of a continuous leadership, he was permitted to retain the chairmanship of the state council. However, what proved to be much more important was the circumstance that Ulbricht's follower O. Gotsche, who as secretary handled the current affairs of the state council, was soon replaced. Thus all connections of the chairman to the apparatus of the state council were interrupted. As a necessary consequence, the state council receded into the background in favor of the council of ministers and essentially ended its activity. These power political changes were legally sanctioned on 11 October 1972 by adoption of the new law on the council of ministers in which

the powers of the council of ministers were significantly expanded and the state council was not even mentioned. The adaptation of the judicial system to the reality of the constitution took place through the revision of the constitution in October 1974. How unimportant the state council had meanwhile become was shown by the fact that the chairmanship could remain vacant for two months after Ulbricht's death on 1 August 1973 until W. Stoph was appointed his successor on 3 October.

The East German example was followed in March 1961 by Romania, where the presidium of the Grand National Assembly was replaced by a state council (Consiliu de Stat). Party chief Gheorgiu-Dej immediately assumed its chairmanship. After his death in March 1965, the two offices were first separated. As soon as the power position of his successor at the head of the party, N. Ceausescu, was sufficiently solidified, he replaced Ch. Stoica as state council chairman in November 1967. In the coming years Ceausescu developed his unlimited leadership role so successfully that he could dare establish an additional top office for himself. By a revision of the constitution, the office of a president of the republic was created in March 1974 and vested with a series of powers which, until that time, had been the prerogative of the state council as a collegial organ. Thus Romania embarked on the road to a presidential constitution.

A decade later Bulgaria finally, as third country, introduced the state council constitution when a new constitution was adopted in May 1971. In this case, too, party chief T. Zhivkov immediately assumed the chairmanship of the newly created state council (Darzhaven Savet). The special feature of the arrangement was in the fact that Zhivkov exchanged the office of chief of government for the chairmanship in the state council. The reason for this maneuver may be found in the desire of the aging dictator to ease his work load and to obtain more representative lustre.

Trend Towards Union of Offices

Since the mid-seventies, a new trend has developed among some party chiefs who, within the existing council of ministers constitution, strive for a further support in the area of the state or a reduction of their everyday workload. The core of this trend lies in the union of the offices of the party and state chief without formally changing the existing council of ministers constitution. Thus a change towards the state council constitution takes place in the constitutional reality. The Mongolian Y. Tsedenbal, who exchanged his chairmanship in the Council of Ministers for the chairmanship in the presidium of the Grand People's Hural in June 1974, may have acted from motives similar to those of Zhivkov. Ten years later the entire procedure was repeated--but this time not at all in the way Tsedenbal wanted it--for it was practiced to settle the succession question already during his lifetime. Tsedenbal had to relinquish the offices of party general secretary and of chairman of the presidium in August and December 1984, respectively to his presumable heir Zh. Batmonh, who, on his part, relinquished his position in the government, which he had headed for a decade.

The second event to be mentioned in this connection happened in East Germany in October 1976, where E. Honecker had successfully consolidated his preeminence.

E. Honecker had himself elected state council chairman, whereby he perhaps regretted what had happened 2 years before that in this respect. Even though Ulbricht's personal union, which since then is being presented as a constitutional postulate by the official jurisprudence,³⁶ was restored, the activity of the state council under Honecker's leadership has grown only a little. By all appearances, Honecker makes use of the opportunities connected with his additional office to play the role of the kind father of the country and--what is even more important--to represent his country in international relations. The latter reason is of importance especially for the treaty-making power, which under international law is assigned to heads of state and not to leaders of political parties.³⁷

The legal problems resulting therefrom possibly bothered Soviet General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, who enjoyed signing international treaties. For this and other reasons he occasionally played with the idea of creating a state council,³⁸ but he was unable to prevail with his ideas against the resistance of his oligarchical partners. However, Brezhnev finally succeeded in June 1977 after he had kicked out the holder of the desired office. N. V. Podgorniy and had himself elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet. After Brezhnev had removed the obstacle in this manner, he was able to have his constitution adopted in October. Even though apparently he had to make concessions to the remaining oligarchs and the idea of a state council could not be implemented, the constitutional competences were so regrouped that the presidium was able to achieve some plus points in relation to the council of ministers.³⁹ However, this trend was stopped by the adoption of the council of ministers law in June 1978.⁴⁰

After Brezhnev's death it appeared as if his successors would follow the road taken by him even though they had to overcome some difficulties in doing so. Andropov needed 7 months to assume the office at the head of the state, while K.U. Chernenko was successful after 2 months. In the meantime (November 1982 to June 1983, February to April 1984) and a third time between March and July 1985, first deputy V.V. Kuznetsov acted for the not existing chairman. But this constitutional practice was dropped by General Secretary S.N. Gorbachev who declared to the astonished deputies of the Supreme Soviet on 2 July 1985 that holding of the office of the chairman of the presidium by the general secretary had proved to be correct for the time after 1977, but that it is inappropriate for the coming period because the general secretary has to concentrate his efforts on the organization of the activity of the central party organs.⁴¹

State Council Constitution in Southeast Asia

In the eighties, the state council constitution had spread to Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, where, under the oligarchical conditions after Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969, a presidential constitution had been adopted, the state council constitution was introduced by the country's third constitution of 1980. The change took place after the state president and supreme commander of the armed forces, Ton Duc Thong, had died and the gerontocrats had to redistribute the leadership offices among themselves. While Le Duan, party general secretary since 1969, and Pham Van Dong, chairman of the council of ministers since 1955, retained their respective positions, the offices of the state president and of

the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly were merged and the holder of the latter office, Truong Chinh, was chosen chairman of the newly created state council.

Hapless Kampuchea had to follow the following year the Vietnamese example under attendant circumstances which lead to the conclusion of the establishment of a tyrannical variant of the state council constitution. The change from the council of ministers constitution (if it is at all meaningful to speak of a constitution in relation to the Pol-Pot regime and the immediately following period of the Vietnamese invasion around the turn of the year 1978/79) to the state council constitution collapsed with the removal from power of the chief of government and party secretary Pen Sovann. Under the influence of the new constitution, the party general secretary, Heng Samrin, also assumed the office of chairman of the state council. However, it is difficult to say whether Heng Samrin is more than a figurehead under Vietnamese control.

Preeminence of the State Council

In normative respect, the preeminence of the state council appears to be more intimated than clearly expressed. The constitutions that expressly claim to be a state council constitution include the constitutions of East Germany between 1968 and 1974, Romania between 1965 and 1974, Bulgaria since 1971, Vietnam since 1980 and Kampuchea since 1981. If the regulations that concern the state power are compared with those that can be found in classical council of ministers constitutions, no clear picture emerges.⁴² The preeminence of the state council in relation to the council of ministers on the one hand and in relation to the presidential organ within the framework of a council of ministers constitution on the other hand can be sensed only by a synopsis of all relevant regulations. Thus the impression can be gained that the state councils have a limited political guideline competence and particularly the determination of defense and security policy.

More pronounced differences exist between the regulations which relate to the constitutional position of the state council chairman. His competences were spelled out in greatest detail in the original version of the GDR constitution of 1968. He was not only the first among equals but manager of the work of the state council (Article 69). Moreover, he represented the GDR under international law (Article 66, paragraph 2, first sentence), ratified state treaties (Article 66, paragraph 2, 3d sentence), was in possession of the active and passive right to establish legations (Article 75, paragraph 1), conferred orders and decorations (Article 76), proposed the chairman of the council of ministers to the People's Chamber (Article 80, paragraph 1) and proclaimed the defense alert (Article 52, 3d sentence). In view of this immense power he--and not the state council as a collegial body--was regarded as head of state.⁴³ In sharp contrast to that, the Romanian constitution of 1965 in its original version declared the "principle of collective leadership" expressly to be the basis of the state council activities (Article 67) and merely granted to the chairman the power of international representation (Article 63, No. 11). With the 1974 revision of the constitution, the situation changed in both countries, however in opposite direction.

The three remaining state council constitutions that remain in force unchanged to this date must be categorized between the two extremes cited above. According

to Article 96 of the Bulgarian constitution, the state council chairman has been assigned an elevated position; for he manages and organizes the work of the state council; furthermore he has the active and passive right to establish legations and can also be assigned additional rights by the state council to be discharged by him exclusively. The Vietnamese constitution emphasizes the collegial nature of the presidency embodied by the state council and assigns to the chairman the rather formal tasks of representing Vietnam in domestic and foreign relations which he has to discharge on behalf of the state council (Article 98, paragraph 3) and of chairing the first session of the newly elected National Assembly (Article 85, paragraph 4). All these regulations are absent in the Kampuchean constitution. But on the other hand, both Indo-chinese constitutions give an extremely important position of power to the chairman, which its Bulgarian counterpart does not provide: He is supreme commander of the armed forces and by his position chairman of the National Defense Council (Article 103 of the Vietnamese constitution, Article 59, paragraph 4 of the Kampuchean constitution).

The political explanation for the differences in the arrangements is obvious. In the case of the GDR and of Bulgaria, the party chief's position of power was not (yet) in doubt when the constitution was drawn up and thus the question arose for the creation of a state office suitable for him. However, the Romanian constitution was proclaimed in August 1965--a few months after Gheorgiu-Dej's death--when the new party chief Ceausescu had not yet sufficiently consolidated his power position. In Vietnam the power-political environment of the new constitution obviously was oligarchical in nature, while in Kampuchea the preparation of a new constitution was conditioned by the Vietnamese occupation, the civil war, and the unstable leadership structure. In both countries the military was a power-political factor.

Special Case of Yugoslavia

Within the family of state council constitutions, Yugoslavia represents a special case. Between 1953 and 1980, the country offered a typical example for a presidential constitution controlled by a charismatic leader. Under the existing circumstances it could be foreseen that some day a sharpened succession crisis would occur because of the multinational problem. In this situation, J.B. Tito proved a statesmanlike feeling of responsibility since he was striving from early on to find a constitutional mechanism that would make possible a smooth transfer of power to an anonymous group of divergent oligarchs.⁴⁴ For this purpose a "presidium of the SFRY" (Predsjedstvo SFRJ) was established in 1971 by means of Amendments XXXV and XXXVI to the constitution of 1963, which was to familiarize itself with the tasks of the future state leadership under Tito's supervision. The further details were regulated in the constitution of February 1974. Accordingly, the office of the state president terminated and his constitutional powers were automatically transferred to the collegial body when Tito died in May 1980. Since then the political and economic development of Yugoslavia cannot by far be described as satisfactory. Even if one reaches the view that the succession regulations merely had the effect of institutionalizing a permanent crisis, this is still better than a complete collapse of Yugoslavia--a possibility that could not be ruled out at that time.

What characterizes the Yugoslav system and differentiates it from all other state council constitutions is the collegial principle pushed by the July 1981

amendments to the constitution. This follows not solely from the collegial structure of the presidium, but is also rooted in federalism and the principle of rotation. The presidium is conceived as the highest state control organ, which has the right of political initiative and equally controls the federal assembly and also the federal executive council (equals the government). The presidium consists of nine members, namely one representative from each of the six republics and two autonomous provinces, which are elected by their respective assemblies for a five-year period, and the respective party chief who is part of the presidium by his position. The direct reelection to the presidium is limited to one time and the chairmanship of the presidium changes in an annual rotation. The powers of the chairman of the presidium are quite extensive (see Article 328 of the constitution), for he performs, among other duties, the supreme command over the armed forces in the name of the presidium. But the path to a one-man rule is blocked by the same regulation which also refers to the chairmanship in the party presidium: The state presidium has to elect every year a new chairman from among its members.

The Presidential Model

At first glance, the presidential constitution differs from the two other constitutional types in that a monocratic head of state is present in the person of the state president. In addition, there are the otherwise usual constitutional organs: an assembly, a government, and a collegial presidential organ of the assembly⁴⁵, which in this case primarily fulfills the functions of a substitute parliament, even though a deviating structure is also possible.

Approximately two-thirds of the communist systems had or continue to have a president and consequently clearly disprove the old Soviet thesis of the socialist nature of a "collective head of state." The historical and political reasons for this mass deviation from the correct path are varied and must be examined separately.⁴⁶ As for the past, Hungary (1946-1949) and Poland (1947-1952) had a short-lived presidency during their early transition period, while East Germany (1949-1960) and especially (North) Vietnam adhered to the presidential model for a long time. Yugoslavia introduced the office of a president in 1953 and abolished it again on the occasion of Tito's death. Between past and present, there is Cuba whose presidential organ is said to have been liquidated in 1976 according to Soviet authors.⁴⁷ In fact, the title of "president of the republic" was dropped but the substance of the presidency at the same time was raised to a thus far unknown dimension.

In looking at the other states which now have a presidential constitution, it becomes evident that in Czechoslovakia alone the institution of the state president has been retained without interruption since pre-communist times. In North Korea (1972) and Romania (1974), the office was later established. China established the institution of a state president in 1954, but gradually abolished it again (1966 in fact, 1969 by law, 1975 by constitution) to finally reestablish it in 1982. In Laos, the chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly is called "president of the republic" since the latter was proclaimed at the end of 1975.

The existence of a state president is a characteristic of the presidential constitution only in a formal sense. It does not necessarily follow from a

presidential constitution that the state power is actually concentrated in the person of the head of state. Whether or not this is the case depends exclusively on the power-political situation. It can be assumed that the state power is concentrated in the person of the president if the party chief occupies the office of the state president. But the constitutional construction is also important. The written constitution can be tailored exclusively to the single person of the dictator and provide for him such powers over the entire state apparatus that the tyrannical nature of the political system is a vital prerequisite of the constitutional order. But more flexible constitutional documents are also conceivable which do not necessarily provide the president with access to the state apparatus and can be enduring in an oligarchical as well as also in a tyrannical shaping of the political system. In this case, there is enough room for developments behind the facade of the written constitution, developments which can lead to a council of ministers or even a state council constitution, since rivalries among the president, the chief of government and the possibly existing chairman of a quasi-state council organ are not impossible and their result can be easily reconciled with the text of the constitution.

These statements show that distinctions must be made between two types of presidential constitutions. The strict or tyrannical presidential constitution presupposes a one-man dictatorship and legally is represented as functioning presidentialism. The weak or open presidential constitution, in contrast, is open for change, i.e. the political system may be a one-man dictatorship or a group dictatorship and the state power structure leaves room for a council of ministers, state council or presidential constitution.

Position of the President

In the analysis of the constitutional position of the president it becomes evident that certain powers are always present. The president represents the state and possesses the traditional rights of a head of state (appointments, formal rights related to the parliament, signing and publication of laws, conferring of orders, right of pardon, etc). He is the holder of powers in foreign affairs (competence to conclude treaties, the right to establish legations, representative authority under international law) and has some exceptional powers. According to the constitutions which speak of military power, the president is usually entrusted with the supreme command over the armed forces and the chairmanship of the defense council--if there is one.

With the exception of the military power, the mentioned legal positions do not open up any direct access for the president to the real instruments of power and can evaporate into purely formal powers also under the conditions of a constitutional state as the Western development from the constitutional to the parliamentary monarchy shows. The capability to fill the constitutional legal positions with real power of decisionmaking must be acquired outside the president's palace. In the case of the state council constitution, the personal union between the offices of the president and of the party chief is the source of this power. Only the military power deserves a differentiated approach. Even though the armed forces are supposed to be subordinated to the party, by their true nature they embody a potential power which can become an independent power. Relevant cases were mentioned in the beginning.

The special constitutional features that set off the tyrannical constitution from the presidential constitution are found mainly in the regulations which concern the relationships of the president to the state apparatus, i.e. his possibilities to influence government and administration.

Tyrannical Presidential Constitutions

Of the presidential constitutions of the present time, the constitution of Cuba (1976), North Korea (1972), and Romania (in the 1974 version) are undoubtedly tyrannical in nature. The listing reflects in declining sequence the extent to which the respective dictator has institutionalized his personal power within the state organization. For the tyrannical nature of the rule it is characteristic that all three dictators officially have adopted titles which are provided neither in the party statutes nor in the constitution, for the purpose of demonstrating, with the aid of propaganda, the totality and charismatic legitimacy of their rule beyond all formal structures of offices. Thus F. Castro is usually called "lider maximo" and N. Ceausescu, "conducator," while Kim Il-song uses several changing titles, of which "sun of the Korean people," "respected and beloved leader," "greatest philosopher and politician in the history of mankind," "great hero of the 20th century," and "matchless hero" are mostly found in the present official praise.⁴⁹ By transforming in this manner "the leading role of the party" into the leadership principle, which is not expressly provided for, but is always present in communist ideology, they follow the practice of Stalin, fascism, and National Socialism.⁵⁰

In Cuba--as it was shown above--Castro practiced his one-man dictatorship until 1976 under the authority of a council of ministers constitution. The constitution adopted in that year institutionalized his total control over the state apparatus by uniting the two top offices of the state in the office of the "state and government chief" (Jefe de Estado y de Gobierno). Thus the chairman of the state council and the chairman of the council of ministers became one and the same person. His prerogatives, which are enumerated mainly in Article 91, are comprehensive; he determines the guidelines of the policy, manages the entire activity of the state council, of the council of ministers and of the executive committee existing within the latter since 1970 and is supreme commander of the armed forces. The state and government chief is elected by the national assembly. The members of the council of ministers are appointed and dismissed at the recommendation of the state and government chief by the national assembly or--between parliamentary sessions--by the state council. As far as direct access to the state apparatus is concerned, the state and government chief has not only the power to control and supervise the operation of all ministries and central administrative organs but he can also take over the direct management at any time. In addition, the first deputy (since 1972 Castro's brother Raul) and the deputy chairmen of the council of ministers, who together with the chairman form the executive committee, have been assigned overall control over a certain group of central administrative departments according to the instructions of the executive committee and its chairman.⁵¹ As a result, the Lider Maximo has the possibility to interfere in the daily administrative dealings--as he chooses.

In North Korea the presidential constitution was established by the constitution of 1972. It was drafted according to Kim Il-song's ideas, who had ruled the

country in dictatorial fashion under a Stalinist council of ministers constitution. The change in the constitution was made because--as the official commentary on the constitution published by the North Korean People's Academy of Sciences in 1973 notes⁵²--"the sole management power of the leader constitutes a cornerstone in the dictatorship of the proletariat." According to the constitutional construction (see especially Articles 89-99), the president of the republic, who is elected by the Supreme People's Assembly and is supported by an indeterminate number (in practice: three) vice-presidents, embodies the full state power.

In addition to the traditional powers of a president, which also comprise the supreme command over the immense armed forces and the chairmanship of the defense council, the president is entitled to the control over both constitutional organs, between which the government and administrative functions are divided. The smaller one, which consists of 15-20 members, is the Central People's Committee, which is to determine domestic and foreign policy and guide and control all state activities. By his office, the president is chairman of this body and determines its personal composition insofar as all members are elected and dismissed by the Supreme People's Assembly at his suggestion. The bigger executive organ, which is composed of 30 to 40 department chiefs, is the Administrative Council of the Government. Its purpose is to take care of mere administrative functions under the supervision of the president. It is headed by a chairman who is elected at the recommendation of the president by the Supreme People's Assembly. In constitutional practice Kim Il-song has conferred the office of the "prime minister" in each case to one of his supporters for a limited time.⁵³ However, the supremacy over the Administrative Council remains with the president who can convoke it at any time and can take over the chairmanship in the sessions. Since the members of the Administrative Council are elected by the Central People's Committee at the recommendation of the "prime minister," who in turn is completely dependent on the president, the president also determines the personal composition of this body.

In Romania, Conducator Ceausescu by constitutional revision of March 1974 transformed the state council constitution into a presidential constitution and thus added the office of the president of the republic to his offices of general secretary of the party and of state council president. The newly added articles 71-76 (especially Article 75) transferred most of the former state council duties to the president, who, in Article 71 is called "chief of state" (seful statului). The president, who is elected by the Grand National Assembly, in his position as chairman of the state council, is supreme commander of the armed forces and chairman of the defense council.⁵⁴

Even though the council of ministers headed by its own chairman was retained, the constitutional change reduced his status to such an extent that the long-term "prime minister" I. Gh. Maurer (1961-1974) immediately resigned. Since then, Ceausescu has been changing his chief administrators with growing rapidity according to the tested principle of the rotating cadres.⁵⁵

Legally that can only be achieved by the state council, for, aside from the Grand National Assembly, it alone has the right to determine the personal composition of the council of ministers. However, the president can appoint and dismiss some ministers at the recommendation of the "prime minister." Compared

with Cuba and North Korea, the Romanian constitution does not appear to open direct access to the state apparatus for the president. However, it should be taken into consideration that since the merger of the leadership positions on regional and local level in the years from 1968 to 1972, the chairmanship in the people's council and its executive committee in every administrative unit is occupied by the first secretary of the party of the respective territory.⁵⁶ As a result, the leader officeholders of the state administration are subordinated to General Secretary Ceausescu in their capacity as party functionaries.

From a historical aspect, Yugoslavia offered the longest-lasting example of a presidential constitution. During its existence (1953-1980) it was subjected to some structural changes which reflected Tito's intention to transform his rule gradually into influence and--since 1971--to prepare for his succession. In summary it can be stated that the president during the first decade of the presidential constitution by virtue of his office was chairman of the federal executive council, i.e. state and government chief. The 1963 constitution did separate both offices, but the president could participate in the sessions of the executive council, could convoke them and take over the chairmanship. The chairman of the executive council was elected by the Skupstina at his recommendation. After Tito had been elected president for life under the 1974 constitution, he was entitled without change to the mentioned rights--as well as the chairmanship in the state presidium created in 1971. But at the same time he favored the development which led to a special state council constitution, as described above.

Open Presidential Constitutions

In looking at the now existing open presidential constitutions, we find in final analysis that the only weak presidential system can be found in Czechoslovakia. To be sure, China and Laos also have presidents, however in reality these countries offer examples for the council of ministers model. In Laos, that is the result of the political situation, while in China this constitutional development, as outlined above, follows the text of the 1982 constitution. The PRC chairman, who can be reelected only once, has only the usual formal rights and is even isolated from the armed forces.

In Czechoslovakia, the institution of the state president is deeply rooted in pre-communist practice. The 1948 constitution was influenced to a considerable extent by a parliamentary system which is kept in balance by a strong president. This concept was not fundamentally changed by Constitutional Law No. 143/1968 which is now valid. Thus, e.g., the Czechoslovak government, following parliamentary practices, is appointed first by the president. Subsequently it appears before the Federal Assembly only to submit its program and to seek a vote of confidence. The president is empowered to participate in the cabinet sessions, to take over the chairmanship, and to request reports from the ministers. He has similar powers as regards the State Defense Council. Furthermore, he is supreme commander of the armed forces.

In the constitutional reality, the office of the president has repeatedly served as additional safeguarding of the preeminence of the party chief in the state area (Gottwald from 1948 to 1953, Novotny from 1957 to 1968). During the

oligarchical periods of the separation, the presidents (Zapotocky from 1953 to 1957 and Svoboda from 1968 to 1975) had to be content with purely formal representation since the office of the prime minister proved to be much more important in political respect. Since May 1975, G. Husak, the party general secretary, is at the same time president of the republic, which indicates his preeminence. Because of more or less open rivalries between conservatives and reactionaries in the party presidium, his position, however, has never been completely free of challenges. As regards his access to the state apparatus, Husak's influence is weakened by the administrative powers of L. Strougal, who has been chief of government since the 1968 occupation.

The East German and North Vietnamese constitutions can be designated as open presidential constitutions of the past. As it were, the GDR between 1949 and 1960 always embodied a council of ministers constitution headed by the jovial figurehead W. Pieck; the latter was no longer able to meet his formal obligations for reasons of health. In contrast to that, the development of the North Vietnamese presidential constitution can be divided into two different phases. In the first period until 1969, in which the country had to endure Ho Chi Min's one-man dictatorship, a true presidential constitution was involved. During the second period, the real constitution vacillated between a council of ministers constitution and a presidential constitution, since the president as well as the chief of government belonged to the ruling oligarchy.

Concluding Remarks

The typology of communist constitutions presented in this example deals with "ideal types" in the sense of Max Weber, i.e. the true constitutions which apply in certain states at certain times correspond to them only more or less. This statement is valid regardless of the intention to develop the individual types of constitutions by way of induction. The methodological problem of generalization is sharpened by the fact that in the present communist states persons--and not the law--control. Therefore the discrepancy between the written law and the reality of law is far greater than is the case in Western systems. For this reason the attempt at achieving an equal connection of factual and legal analyses is indispensable to obtain a workable typology whose main function it is to direct the research interest at the truly essential facts. Nevertheless the practical application of the tool of typology for the purpose of discovering similarities and differences of different constitutional systems will remain an arduous undertaking. When Napoleon recommended to the writer of the constitution that "une constitution doit etre courte et obscure" the constitutional researcher may be sure that "sa verification sera longue et dure."

Holders of the Top Offices in Communist Systems (as of Early 1986)

	Parteichef (1)	Regierungschef (2)	Staatsoberhaupt (3)		Militärchef (6)
			Präsident (4)	Kollegialorgan (5)	
Albanien (7)	Erster Sekretär (13) <i>R. Alia</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (16) <i>A. Çarçani</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Präsidiums der Volksversammlung (20) <i>R. Alia</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Verteidigungsrats (24) <i>R. Alia</i>
Bulgarien (8)	Generalsekretär (14) <i>T. Živkov</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (16) <i>G. Filipov</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (21) <i>T. Živkov</i>	Vorsitzender des Staatlichen Verteidigungskomitees (25) ?
China (9)	Generalsekretär (14) <i>Hu Yaobang</i>	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (17) <i>Zhao Ziyang</i>	Vorsitzender des Staates (19) <i>Li Xiannian</i>	Vorsitzender des Ständigen Ausschusses des Nationalen Volkskongresses (22) <i>Peng Zhen</i>	Vorsitzender der Zentralen Militärkommission (26) <i>Deng Xiaoping</i>
Deutsche Demokratische Republik (10)	Generalsekretär (14) <i>E. Honecker</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (16) <i>W. Stoph</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (21) <i>E. Honecker</i>	Vorsitzender des Nationalen Verteidigungsrats (27) <i>E. Honecker</i>
Jugoslawien (11)	Vorsitzender des ZK-Präsidiums (jährlich wechselnd) (15) <i>V. Žurković</i>	Vorsitzende des Bundesexekutivrats (18) <i>M. Planinc</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Staatspräsidiums (jährlich wechselnd) (23) <i>R. Vlačjović</i>	Vorsitzender des Volksverteidigungsrats (jährlich wechselnd) (28) <i>R. Vlačjović</i>
Kambodscha (12)	Generalsekretär (14) <i>Heng Samrin</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (16) <i>Hun Sen</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (21) <i>Heng Samrin</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Nationalen Verteidigungsrats (29) <i>Heng Samrin</i>

Key:

1. Party chief
2. Chief of Gov't
3. Head of state
4. President
5. Collegial organ
6. Military chief
7. Albania
8. Bulgaria
9. PRC
10. GDR
11. Yugoslavia
12. Kampuchea
13. First secretary
14. General secretary
15. Chairman of Central Committee presidium (changing annually)
16. Chairman of council of ministers
17. Chairman of the state council
18. Chairman of federal executive council
19. Chairman of state presidium
20. Chairman of presidium of the people's assembly
21. Chairman of state council
22. Chairman of Standing committee of national congress
23. Chairman of state presidium (changing annually)
24. Supreme commander and chairman of defense council
25. Chairman of state defense committee
26. Chairman of central military commission
27. Chairman of national defense council
28. Chairman of people's defense council (changing annually)
29. Supreme Commander and chairman of national defense council

	Parteichef (1)	Regierungschef (2)	Staatsoberhaupt (3)		Militärchef (6)
			Präsident (4)	Kollegialorgan (5)	
Kuba (7)	Erster Sekretär (11) <i>F. Castro</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13)	-	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (16) Staats- und Regierungschef (17) <i>F. Castro</i>	Oberbefehlshaber (21) <i>F. Castro</i>
Laos	Generalsekretär (12) <i>Kayson Phomvihane</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>Kayson Phomvihane</i>	Präsident und Vorsitzender der Obersten Volksversammlung (18) <i>Suphanuvong</i>	-	-
Mongolei (8)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>Zh. Batmunch</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>D. Sodnom</i>	Vorsitzender des Präsidiums des Großen Volkschural (19) <i>Zh. Batmunch</i>	-	-
Nordkorea (9)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>Kim Il-Sung</i>	Vorsitzender des Zentralen Volkskomitees (14) <i>Kim Il-Sung</i> Vorsitzender des Verwaltungsrats (15) <i>Kang Son-San</i>	Staatspräsident (23) <i>Kim Il-Sung</i>	Vorsitzender des Ständigen Komitees der Obersten Volksversammlung (20) <i>Jan Chen-Seb</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Landesverteidigungskomitees (22) <i>Kim Il-Sung</i>
Polen (10)	Erster Sekretär (11) <i>W. Jaruzelski</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>Z. Messner</i>	-	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (16) <i>W. Jaruzelski</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Nationalen Verteidigungskomitees (22) <i>W. Jaruzelski</i>

Key:

1. Party chief
2. Chief of gov't
3. Head of state
4. President
5. Collegial organ
6. Military chief
7. Cuba
8. Mongolia
9. North Korea
10. Poland
11. First secretary
12. General secretary
13. Chairman of council of ministers
14. Chairman of central people's committee
15. Chairman of administrative council
16. Chairman of state council
17. State & gov't chief
18. President & chairman of supreme people's assembly
19. Chairman of presidium of Great People's Hural
20. Chairman of standing committee of supreme people's assembly
21. Supreme commander
22. Supreme commander & chairman of national defense committee
23. State president

	Parteichef (1)	Regierungschef (2)	Staatsoberhaupt (3)		Militärchef (6)
			Präsident (4)	Kollegialorgan (5)	
Rumänien (7)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>N. Ceaușescu</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>C. Dăscălescu</i>	Staatspräsident (15) <i>N. Ceaușescu</i>	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (16) <i>N. Ceaușescu</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Verteidigungsrats (20) <i>N. Ceaușescu</i>
Sowjetunion (8)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>M. S. Gorbachev</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>N. I. Ryzkov</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Präsidiums des Obersten Sowjets (17) <i>A. A. Gromyko</i>	Vorsitzender des Verteidigungsrats (21) <i>M. S. Gorbachev</i>
Tschechoslowakei (9)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>G. Husák</i>	Vorsitzender der Regierung (14) <i>L. Štrougal</i>	Staatspräsident (15) <i>G. Husák</i>	Vorsitzender der Bundesversammlung (18) <i>A. Indra</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Staatlichen Verteidigungsrats (22) <i>G. Husák</i>
Ungarn (10)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>J. Kádár</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>Gy. Lázár</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Präsidialrats (19) <i>P. Losonczi</i>	—
Vietnam (11)	Generalsekretär (12) <i>Le Duan</i>	Vorsitzender des Ministerrats (13) <i>Pham Van Dong</i>	—	Vorsitzender des Staatsrats (16) <i>Truong Chinh</i>	Oberbefehlshaber und Vorsitzender des Nationalen Verteidigungsrats (23) <i>Truong Chinh</i>

Key:

1. Party chief
2. Chief of gov't
3. Head of state
4. President
5. Collegial organ
6. Military chief
7. Romania
8. USSR
9. CSSR
10. Hungary
11. Vietnam
12. General secretary
13. Chairman of council of ministers
14. Chairman of gov't
15. State president
16. Chairman of state council
17. Chairman of presidium of supreme soviet
18. Chairman of federal assembly
19. Chairman of presidential council
20. Supreme commander & chairman of defense council
21. Chairman of defense council
22. Supreme commander & chairman of state defense council
23. Supreme commander & chairman of national defense council

FOOTNOTES

1. See, e.g., R.F. Staar, "The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe," Stanford, California 1967, 4th edition, 1982; F.-Chr. Schroeder-B. Meissner (Editors). "Constitutional and Administrative Reforms in the Socialist States," Berlin 1978; R.G. Wesson, "Communism and Communist Systems," Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1978; R.K. Furtak, "The Political Systems of the Socialist States," Munich 1979; B. Szajkowski (Editor), "Marxist Governments," 3 volumes, London 1981; T. Rakowska-Harmstone (Editor), "Communism in Eastern Europe," Bloomington, Ind. 1979, 2d edition 1984. Integrally comparing: H.G. Skilling, "The Governments of Communist East Europe," New York 1966; R.C. Gripp, "The Political System of Communism," New York 1973. In part integrally, in part separately by individual countries: M. Lesage, "Les regimes politiques de l'U.R.S.S. et de l'Europe de l'Est," Paris 1971; R. Charvin, "Les Etats socialistes europeens," Paris 1975.
2. See, e.g., A. Kh. Makhnenko, "Gosugarstvennoe pravo zaruzhebnykh sotsialisticheskikh stran," Moscow 1970; T. Szymchak, "Organy władzy i administracji europejskich panstw," Warsaw 1970; S. Zdobinsky (Editor), "Statni pravo evropskych socialistickych zemi," Prague 1976; V.E. Chirkin--B.N. Topornin (Editors), "Gosudarstvennoe pravo zaruzhebnykh sotsialisticheskikh stran," Moscow 1976; S. Zdobinsky--S. Matousek (editor), "Statni pravo socialistickych zemi," Prague 1983; L.D. Voevodin--D.L. Zlatopol'sky, "Gosudarstvennoe pravo zaruzhebnykh sotsialisticheskikh stran," Moscow 1984. More thorough and analytical: O. Bihari, "A szocialista allamszervezet alkotmanyos modelljei," Budapest 1968 (The Constitutional Models of Socialist State Organization, Budapest 1979). Partially all-encompassing, partially separate by individual countries: L.D. Voevodin--D.L. Zlatopolskiy--N. Ya. Kuprits, "Gosudarstvennoe pravo stran narodnoy demokratii," Moscow 1960; L.M. Gudoshnikov--V.F. Kotok (Editor)--V.A. Tumanov--N.P. Faverov, "Gosudarstvennoe pravo stran narodnoy demokratii," Moscow 1961. Purely separate presentations of the individual countries: S. Zdobinsky (Editor), "Statni zrizeni evropskych socialistickych zemi," Prague 1973; T. Szymczak, "Ustroj europejskich panstw socjalistycznych," Warsaw 1983.
3. A sole exception is the latest Chinese constitution of 1982, which--in contrast to its predecessors of 1975 and 1978--contains only a casual reference in the preamble in this respect; concerning further details see J. Barret, "What's New in China's New Constitution?, Review of Socialist Law 1983," p 305 ff. (318 ff.), where a comparison with other communist constitutions is made. Cf. further, G. Brunner, "The Functions of the Constitution in the Socialist States in Light of the Recent Constitutional Legislation" in: Schroeder--Meissner (footnote 1), p 11 ff (p 20 ff).
4. Concerning a listing of the offices occupied by members of the respective clan, see R. de Flers, "Biographical Sketches of the Ceausescu Clan," RFE-RL Background Report 135 of 27 July 1984; Lee

Dong-Bok, "North Korea After the Sixth Congress, Korea and World Affairs 1981" p 423; Yu Suk-Ryul, "Political Succession in North Korea, Korea and World Affairs 1982," p 570; Park Soo-Hyuck, "Constitutional Systems in Divided Korea and the Basic Features of a Uniform Constitution in Case of Reunification," dissertation, Wuerzburg 1984, p 97.

5. J.F. Hough, "The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory," Cambridge, Mass. 1977, p 10 ff, 22 ff. A little later he dealt with this topic under the heading "diffusion of power"; J.F. Hough--M. Fainsod, "How the Soviet Union Is Governed," Cambridge, Mass. 1979, p 543 ff.
6. Concerning further details see G. Brunner, "Socialist Constitutions--Recent Constitutional Developments in East European States," in: F.J.M. (Editor), "Codification in the Communist World," Leiden 1975, p 53 ff.
7. The only country that does not have a written constitution is Laos. The latest comprehensive collection of communist constitutions are the following: G. Brunner--B. Meissner (Editor), "Constitutions of the Communist States," Paderborn 1979; W.B. Simons (Editor), "The Constitutions of the Communist World," Alphen 1980; W. Lungwitz (Editor), "Constitutions of Foreign Socialist States," East Berlin 1982. For the texts of earlier constitutions, cf.: "The Constitutions of the European People's Democracies," East Berlin 1953; "The Constitutions of the Asiatic People's Democracies," East Berlin 1955; J.F. Triska (Editor), "The Constitutions of the Communist Party-States," Stanford, California 1968.
8. At present the following constitutions are in force--without taking later changes into consideration; their respective predecessors are indicated in parentheses:

Albania: Constitution of 28 Dec 76 (1946/50);

Bulgaria: Constitution of 16 May 71 (1947);

PRC: Constitution of 4 Dec 82 (1954, 1975, 1978);

GDR: Constitution of 6 Apr 68 in the version of 27 Feb 74 (1949);

Yugoslavia: Constitution of 21 Feb 72 (1946, 1953, 1963);

Kampuchea: Constitution of 2 1981 (1976);

Cuba: Constitution of 24 Feb 76;

Mongolia: Constitution of 6 Jul 60 (1924, 1940);

North Korea: Constitution of 27 Dec 72 (1948);

Poland: Constitution of 22 Jul 52 in the version of 16 Feb 76;

Romania: Constitution of 20 Aug 65 in the version of 8 Apr 74 (1948, 1952);

USSR: Constitution of 7 Oct 77 (1922/24, 1936);

Czechoslovakia: The constitution of 11 Jul 60 (1948) is now only partly in effect; since 1968 numerous constitutional laws have been adopted, the most important of which is constitutional law 143/1968 on the Czechoslovak Federation of 27 Oct 69;

Hungary: Constitution of 20 Aug 49 in the version of 19 Apr 72;

Vietnam: Constitution of 18 Dec 80 (1949, 1959).

9. For this reason modern analyses of the social composition of "socialist parliaments" and the like, as they can be found in most articles of the volumes by D. Nelson--S. White (Editor), "Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective," London 1982, are useless. It would make more sense to examine on a comparative basis what the "supreme organs of state power" really do. Up to a point this was done by S. Lammich, "Basic Features of Socialist Parliamentarism, Baden-Baden 1977. Concerning some assembly organs, see P.J. Lapp, "The GDR People's Chamber," Opladen 1975; P. Vannemann, "The Supreme Soviet," Durham NC 1977.
10. Bihari (footnote 2, English), p 139.
11. Exceptions are the CSSR ("government"), Yugoslavia ("federal executive council"), PRC ("state council"), and North Korea where a special structure exists and of the two organs to be taken into consideration, the "Central People's Committee" is to be regarded more the government than the "Administrative Council of the Government."
12. Albania, CSSR, Mongolia, USSR.
13. PRC, North Korea, Laos. Since the PRC--as did the USSR before 1936--has a congress-like assembly organ, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is not completely comparable with the other presidia and standing committee. With its nearly 200 members, it is much bigger than usual and its current affairs are handled by a chairmen's conference.
14. This organ is called "presidium" in Yugoslavia and "presidential council" in Hungary, whereby the presidential characteristic refers to the state and not to the assembly.
15. Bulgaria, Kampuchea, Cuba, the GDR, Poland, Romania, Vietnam.
16. The title "president of...." is used in the CSSR, North Korea, Laos and Romania. The PRC head of state is called "chairman of the....," while the Cuban constitution in the Spanish manner speaks of the "chief of state and government" (Jefe de Estado y de Gobierno).
17. It could apply to Albania (articles 81, 89 of the constitution), Bulgaria (article 93, No. 10 of the constitution), PRC (articles 93, 94 of the constitution), the GDR (articles 50, 73 of the constitution),

the CSSR (constitutional law 10/1969), North Korea (articles 93, 105 of the constitution), Romania (article 74 of the constitution), the USSR (article 121, No 14 of the constitution), Vietnam (articles 86, 90, 93, 103 of the constitution), and Yugoslavia (article 328, paragraph 2, article 131 of the constitution). In Kampouchea there probably also exists a national defense council (article 59, paragraph 4 of the constitution). However, the Polish defense council was subordinated to the council of ministers until the change in the 1967 defense law on 22 Nov 83 (DZIENNIK USTAW 1983, No. 66, pos. 297), when it was given the higher constitutional rank which the defense councils of the states mentioned above hold.

18. The constitutions of Mongolia of 1924 and 1940 knew of two additional assembly organs in the form of the Great and Small Hural. The Small Hural was abolished by the 1960 constitution.
19. Such laws were issued in the PRC (1949, 1954, 1982), Cuba (1976), the GDR (1950, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1972), Mongolia (1984), the USSR (1978), Vietnam (1960), and Yugoslavia (1963, 1965, 1971, 1974). In Poland corresponding regulations were made by decision of the council of ministers itself (1957, 1969).
20. I refer to the studies by G.P. van den Berg: "De regering van Rusland en de Sovjet Unie," dissertation, Leiden 1977; "The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Review of Socialist Law 1980," p 293 ff.; "Organization and Method of Operation of the Soviet Government," Baden-Baden 1984. See further E. Tomson, "The USSR Council of Ministers," Berlin 1980.
21. P.J. Lapp, "The GDR Council of Ministers," Opladen 1982.
22. In recent Hungarian literature it is openly admitted that the party leadership governs, while the state leadership merely issues laws: L. Ficzer, "A Minisztertanács a politikai és kormányzati rendszerven," JOGTUDOMÁNYI KOZLONY 1983, p 435 ff (441).
23. Albania (article 83, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the constitution), PRC (article 88, paragraphs 2 and 3--"Standing Committee"), Cuba (article 95--"Executive Committee"), the CSSR (article 77, paragraph 2 of constitutional law 143/1968), the GDR (article 80, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the constitution), Poland (article 39, paragraph 2 of the constitution), Romania (article 80, paragraph 3 of the constitution--"Executive Bureau"), the USSR (article 132 of the constitution).
24. Known exceptions are the Hungarian council of ministers, the North Korean people's committee, and the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council.
25. Party chief Gottwald was president of the Czechoslovak Republic from 1948 to 1953, while the East German dictator Ulbricht was content with the position of a deputy prime minister (1949-1960) until President Pieck's death.

26. As legal and political analysis of the events, see E.-M. Bader, "The coup Against the Polish 'Social Contract'," *EUROPA-ARCHIV* 1982, p 227 ff; S. Lammich, "Martial Law in Poland," *JURISTEN-ZEITUNG* 1982, p 327 ff.; E. Gralla, "The Emergency Constitution in Poland Following the Events of 13 December 1981," *RECHT IN OST UND WEST*, special issue 1983, p 11 ff.
27. Cf. of the numerous writings oriented on constitutional law, e.g., F. Schurmann, "Ideology and Organization in Communist China," Berkeley, California 1966, 2d edition 1968; E. Tomson--Jyun-hsyong Su, "Government and Administration of the PRC," Cologne 1972; H.C. Hinton, "An Introduction to Chinese Politics," Newton Abbot 1973; J. Domes, "Political Sociology of the PRC," Wiesbaden 1980.
28. Concerning these events, cf. S.R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i 1939-1969," *ASIAN SURVEY* 1972, p 275 ff.; J.R. Townsend, "Politics in China," Boston 1974, p 277 ff.
29. Concerning further details see R.D. Nethercut, "Leadership in China," *PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM*, Mar/Apr 83, p 30 ff.
30. Cf. Barrett (footnote 3); T. Saich, "The Fourth Constitution of the People's Republic of China," *REVIEW OF SOCIALIST LAW* 1983, p 112 ff.
31. In the Polish constitutional history there is no state council whose memory could have been revived. It is an open question whether the originators of the Small Constitution had in mind the French Conseil d'Etat of Napoleonic origin, the Prussian state council, or the tsarist Russian Gosudarstvennyi Sovet.
32. Cf. the comparative law studies: K. Dzialocha--T. Pusylewitsch, "The Legal Character of the Supreme Presidential Organs of the Socialist States From the Aspect of Their Legal Functions," *JAHRBUCH FUER OSTRECHT* 1971, Vol 12/2, p 9 ff.; S. Lammich, "The Institution of the Supreme Presidential Organ and of the Head of State in the Socialist Countries of Europe," *RECHT IN OST UND WEST* 1977, p 207 ff.
33. Most studies relate to the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and are concentrated (too strongly) on the legal aspects. In the first place reference is to be made to the monograph by H.-Ch. Reichel, "The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR," Baden-Baden (1976). In addition, two articles are to be mentioned: M. Lesage, "Le Praesidium du Soviet Supreme de l'U.R.S.S.," *Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France et a l'Etranger* 1968, p 605 ff.; C.-G. Sproegel, "The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR," *JAHRBUCH FUER OSTRECHT* 1972, Vol 13/1, p 53 ff. Very valuable is the comparative monograph on the Soviet presidium and the Hungarian presidential council by H.G. Heinrich, "Constitutional Reality in Eastern Europe," Vienna 1980. Finally an excellent study on Ulbricht's state council is to be mentioned which focuses on the constitutional reality: P.J. Lapp, "The State Council in the Political System of the GDR (1960-1971)," Opladen 1972. For its later

development, see also: G. Brunner, "The Head of State of the GDR," in: "Unity, Law, and Freedom, Publication in Honor of Karl Carstens," Cologne 1984, p 509 ff.

35. Examples of direct subordination under the state council are: the central directorate for statistics (1970), the state inspectorate for the control of goods production (1970/72), the legislative council (1971), the national commission for demography (1971), the auditing agency (1973). Of the mixed party-state organs which are characteristic for Romania, the Economic Council (1969)--later on renamed Central Council for Worker Control of Economic and Social Activity (1972)--the Supreme Council for Economic Development (1973) and the Council for Economic and Social Organization (1973) are directly subordinated to the state council, while the subordination of the Defense Council (1969) under the Grand National Assembly has the same effect since the state council acts for the assembly. This phenomenon was discussed in detail by G.H. Tontsch, "Party and State in Romania," Cologne 1985, p 39 f., 144 ff.
36. In both editions of the textbook on constitutional law, which were published following Honecker's appointment as head of state, it is explained that the general secretary of the SED Central Committee is chairman of the state council and that this reflects the leading role of the party in the developed socialist society; "GDR Constitutional Law," textbook, East Berlin 1977, p 342; 2d edition 1984, p 296.
37. Concerning the international practice in connection with the conclusion of treaties by communist party leaders, see D. Frenzke, "The Communist Party Chiefs in the International Treaties and Organization as a Methodological Problem," OSTEUROPA-RECHT 1975, p 178 ff.
38. Such speculations have been caused especially by the article of V.G. Belyayeva--O.E. Leist, "Soedineniye zakonatel'stvovaniya i upravleniya predstavitel'nykh organakh vlast Sovetskogo gosudarstva," "SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 1973, No. 9, p 17 ff. (21).
39. B. Meissner, "The Highest Organs of State Power and State Administration," OSTEUROPA-RECHT 1978, p 101 ff. (105 ff.).
40. G. Brunner, "The New Soviet Constitution and its Effects on the Legal System," in: DIE SOWJETUNION HEUTE, Berlin 1981, p 37 ff (45 ff).
41. PRAVDA of 3 Jul 85. However, at the same opportunity the promoted Central Committee secretary E.K. Ligachev stated that Gorbachev should be elected member of the presidium since the membership of the general secretary in this body has had a good effect and reflects the leading role of the CPSU in the political system and in Soviet society.
42. See footnote 32.

43. K. Sorgenicht--W. Weichelt--T. Riemann--H.J. Demler (Editor), "Constitution of the German Democratic Republic. Documents, Commentary," East Berlin 1969, Vol 2, pp 263, 301, 307, 308, 314, 335.
44. Tito's arrangements--quite unusual in the communist world--were comparable only to those of the Spaniard Franco who developed and institutionalized in his lifetime step by step a "regular government" which at his death was to automatically replace the "extraordinary government." After his death in 1975 his farsighted arrangements proved to be so suitable that within a short time the autocratic system could be transformed into a democracy.
45. The only exceptions were Yugoslavia between 1953 and 1971 and Cuba until 1976.
46. At present there is only one Polish monograph, T. Szymczak, "Evolucja instytucji prezydenta w socjalistycznym prawie państwowym," Lodz 1976.
47. Voevodin--Zlatopol'skiy (footnote 2), p 319.
48. This is all the more remarkable since before him the fascist dictator of Romania, Marshall J. Antonescu, used the same title. Concerning the psychological associations making the rounds in Romania, see Tontsch (footnote 35), p 118.
49. Yu-Suk-Ryul (footnote 4), p 568 f.; Young Whan Kihl, "Politics and Policies in Divided Korea," Boulder, Colorado 1984, p 71.
50. I refer to the title "vozhd," "Duce," and "Fuehrer," which were used by Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler, respectively.
51. Article 17 of Law No. 1323 on the Organization of the Central State Administration of 30 Nov 76 (GAZETA OFICIAL, Extraordinaria, No. 5/1976).
52. Quoted according to Park Soo-Hyuck (footnote 4), p 267.
53. Kim Il-Song (1972-1976), Park Song-Chol (1976-1977), Yi Jong-Ok (1977-1984), Kang Song-San (since 1984).
54. As a legal oddity it should be noted that according to articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 5/1969 on the Establishment, Organization, and Duties of the Defense Council, which was adopted in March 1969 (BULETINUL OFICIAL, part I, No. 32/1969), the party general secretary is chairman of the defense council. Since then this regulation has not been changed even though article 74 of the constitution in the 1974 version designates the president as chairman.
55. M. Manescu (1974-1979), I. Verdet (1979-1982), C. Dascalescu (since 1982).

56. Up to 1975 a proposal by Ceausescu in his report to the party national conference in 1967 was the sole basis on which the policy of personal union could be based. A partial legal confirmation occurred through the State Council decree No 21/1975 on the Composition of the Executive Committees and Bureaus of the People's Councils (BULETINUL OFICIAL Part I, No. 28/1975). Concerning these observations, see, e.g., M. Cismarescu, "The 1965-1975 Constitutional Development of the Socialist Republic of Romania," "Yearbook of Public Law 1975," (Vol 24), p 231 ff. (269 ff.); Tontsch (footnote 35), p 120 ff.

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CSO: 8120/0976

POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WFTU, STUDENTS UNION CONDEMN U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA

AU271423 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Mar 86 p 8

[CTK report]

[Text] Prague -- The WFTU yesterday [25 March] issued a declaration calling for a global protest against the U.S. provocations vis-a-vis Libya. The declaration states, among other things: "With the objective of escalating military provocations, naval vessels and aircraft of the U.S. 6th Naval Fleet have carried out aggressive attacks against Libya and violated its state sovereignty and integrity. These armed attacks and provocations are a gross infringement of international laws and the UN Charter, and increase tension in the region that seriously endangers peace." In the name of its 206 million members on all continents, the WFTU condemns these U.S. aggressive actions and demands their immediate halt. It calls on the working people and trade union organizations in all countries to express their solidarity with the Libyan people.

The Secretariat of the International Students Union yesterday voiced a vehement protest in connection with the act of banditry by American militarists vis-a-vis sovereign Libya. The letter, addressed to the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, states that millions of students on our planet follow with increasing indignation the provocative U.S. military actions against a peace-loving state in the north of Africa, its people, and students. The policy of American Government circles aimed at destabilizing the situation in the region and undermining the achievements of the Libyan revolution really endangers peace. The letter contains the demand to adopt immediate measures for condemning the aggressor.

/12640

CSO: 2400/243

POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MAIN PART OF CPCZ POLITICAL REPORT PUBLISHED

LD241141 Prague CTK in English 1035 GMT 24 Mar 86

["Main Parts from Political Report to Czechoslovak Party Congress" --
CTK headline]

[Text] Prague 24 March (CTK) -- "We look into the future with optimism. In spite of the aggravated international situation we are convinced that peace will be preserved. This is guaranteed by the unity of the socialist community, by cooperation and concerted action with all progressive and realistic forces in the world."

This was stressed in the Political Report of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee to the 17th Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, delivered by Party General Secretary Gustav Husak here today.

"The construction of socialism and its further successful development are a convincing proof of the correctness of the policy of our party," Gustav Husak said. He recalled that the preparations for the congress were characterized by a businesslike, constructive, and highly moral political climate. Hundreds of thousands of party members and other citizens actively joined in the party and public discussions on the draft documents prepared and published for the congress. The mainstream expressed total support to the political course of the party, our internal and external policies. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia proved its ideological unity and cohesion. The preparations for the congress were accompanied by an upsurge of working activity and initiative.

Gustav Husak stated that the preparations for the Congress of the Czechoslovak Communists were fruitfully influenced by the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which became an event of extraordinary significance and far-reaching historic impact, and is bound to take an important place in the context of the peoples' struggle for peace and social progress. The 27th congress was a congress of creative Leninism and of historical optimism and its deliberations and conclusions became an inspiring force also for the Czechoslovak party and the Czechoslovak people.

Gustav Husak went on to say that the past period was filled with fruitful constructive work of the party and the people. At the turn of the 1970's and the 1980's, the international situation rapidly deteriorated. The majority of the imperialist states intensified their discriminatory course against the socialist world. Profound changes took place in the world economy, negatively influencing also internal development in Czechoslovakia. This situation placed high demands on all work. At the same time, some weaknesses were exposed, especially in an inflexible and unsystematic use of intensive factors, Gustav Husak said.

Gustav Husak recalled that in the first two years of the 7th 5-year plan the rate of economic growth slowed down. "The Central Committee and the government were forced to adopt several extraordinary measures aimed at safeguarding both the internal and external economic equilibrium and at creating the necessary prerequisites for the restoration of a dynamic growth of national income. Some changes in the plan were made, the investment and import policies were made more strict, we introduced several changes in the structure of production and consumption including some inevitable price modifications. Life proved the correctness of the decisions taken. As a result, already in 1983, the dynamic of economic development was restored, as laid down by the 16th congress, and thus an all-around implementation of the tasks outlined by the congress was achieved.

Czechoslovakia has had undisputed successes in industry, in agriculture, and in other sectors. In all, the national economy proved its ability to develop successfully even under basically more demanding conditions. The basic directive of the 16th congress -- to preserve and further improve the living standard of the people, to ensure their life certainties and social securities -- was fulfilled.

Gustav Husak pointed out that in realizing the general line of building developed socialist society Czechoslovakia marked major progress in all spheres in the past fifteen years.

The national income increased by 81 percent, the volume of industrial production has grown by 97 percent, agricultural production has risen by one-third and the level of self-sufficiency in the sphere of food production was raised.

Since 1970 cooperation in the spheres of economy, science and technology with the member countries at the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, particularly with the Soviet Union, intensified substantially. The total volume of foreign trade has practically doubled, the share of the USSR in the Czechoslovak foreign trade turnover reached nearly 45 percent, and that of the CMEA member countries came to 74 percent.

These results have allowed a 44-percent increase in personal consumption. Material social consumption (i.e. state spendings on social security, health services, culture, education, etc.) has increased by 109 percent. Nearly 1,800,000 flats were built and the social security

system was substantially expanded for all citizens. "The development we have achieved since the early 1970's are a telling answer to all the anti-socialist and revisionist forces who foretold that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would never extricate itself from the crisis of the late 1960's," Gustav Husak said and continued,

"We took the consistent path of strengthening the power of the people, the socialist state, enhancing socialist democracy. The position of the working class was strengthened, and so were its ties with cooperative farmers and the intelligentsia. The socialist awareness of our people has been strengthened, their education was elevated, the moral and political unity of our society has grown. The Leninist principle of the federative arrangement of the state has proved its worth." He stressed that Czechoslovakia enters the latter half of the 1980's as a consolidated, politically strong, economically and socially mature country with a high living and cultural standard of the people.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia never lost sight of the need for socialist community, to strengthen its international political position and international authority. In its internationalist alliance with the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries associated in the Warsaw Treaty, the defence capability and security of Czechoslovakia have been strengthened. Czechoslovakia takes active part in the great struggle for peace and social progress, said Gustav Husak.

The general secretary said that the successes were achieved thanks to the principled policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and to its close alliance with the working people, its organizational and ideological activities. He pointed out that the fact that Czechoslovakia can rely on the socialist communist, on firm friendship, alliance and selfless cooperation with the Soviet Union and its communist party is the basis of success.

The positive balance-sheet being presented does not mean that everything went smoothly. What is important is that problems should not be glossed over, not circumvented, but tackled in good time. Any contradictions between words and deeds must not be tolerated, Gustav Husak said.

The Czechoslovak people justifiably link the dynamic development of society with the activity of the communist party, with the party's leading role which logically expands with the advance of socialist construction.

Gustav Husak stressed that the key issue at the present stage is to speed up the social and economic development of society, to substantially raise the efficiency and effectiveness of the national economy. "The purpose of all our efforts, as we see it, is primarily to further raise the living standard of the people and to strengthen their social certainties. It is necessary to create conditions for the satisfaction of new, qualitatively higher requirements of citizens, for the harmonious development of the people's personalities and for the enhancement of the socialist way of life," he said.

The general secretary said that in the next fifteen years the national income is to increase by more than two-thirds, while the relative consumption of materials and energy in industry is to be strongly reduced. The social productivity of labour is to go up by nearly two-thirds. This will make it possible to increase the population's personal consumption by at least 50 percent, to further increase social consumption, to build and modernize 1.5 million flats and to handle ecological problems more resolutely. This will ensure a materially and spiritually richer life of Czechoslovak citizens, improvement of their living and working conditions, further progress in creating conditions of life corresponding to socialist principles. Necessary conditions will be created for ensuring the defence capability of the country.

Gustav Husak spoke of the need for an all-round intensification of the economy, which is conditional on a substantial acceleration of scientific and technological progress and on a consistent application of its results. A radical development of science and technology is the decisive way of attaining an overall increase in the productivity of labour, which will enable Czechoslovakia to occupy a leading position among the world's industrialized countries and to contribute effectively to the strengthening of the positions of socialism in the peaceful competition with capitalism. Ensuing from this is the enormous importance of Czechoslovakia's part in the implementation of the Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technological Progress of the Member States of CMEA Until the Year 2000, which represents a qualitatively new step forward in the process of socialist economic integration.

"We consider the implementation of this program a key task of our economic, scientific and technological policy and will continue to focus on it," Gustav Husak continued.

Czechoslovakia attaches primary importance to the implementation of the Long-Term Program of Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation With the USSR Until the Year 2000, he said.

Czechoslovakia must make the decisive step in the implementation of the long-term strategic line of economic and social development already during the 8th 5-Year Plan period (1986-90). The basic requirement is to achieve an 18-19 percent growth in national income, with the provision that 92-95 percent of this increment must be accounted for by higher social productivity of labour. The Communist Party Central Committee considers the 3.5 percent annual growth of the national income minimal, Gustav Husak stressed.

The engineering industry, whose production is to increase by roughly 25 percent by 1990, must be assigned the decisive role in the speeding up of scientific and technological progress and in the modernization of

the production base. The output of the electrical engineering industry is to go up by nearly two-thirds.

Gustav Husak said it is necessary to ensure that at the end of the 8th 5-Year Plan about 30 percent of electricity is generated by nuclear power stations, and by the end of the century, at least 50 percent. The policy of the party and the socialist state will also go on ensuring a high standard of rational nutrition, a further increase in the degree of Czechoslovakia's self-sufficiency in food.

Gustav Husak went on to say that the safeguarding of further dynamic development of the national economy requires continuous improvement of the system of planning and economic management, as well as the gradual reconstruction of the economic mechanism. In this respect, the decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU are of special importance also for Czechoslovakia. In the interest of promoting socialist economic integration, the need for bringing the systems of management of the member countries of CMEA closer together should be taken into account.

The development and management of the economy should also proceed from the principles of democratic centralism -- the improvement of central management, while strengthening the responsibilities and powers at the lower levels and mainly the all-round support to promoting the initiative and material incentives of working teams. The entire system of management should be based on a balanced relationship between the center and the initiative at the lower levels.

Gustav Husak said the party attaches primary importance to a well-premediated social policy geared towards further advances in the improvement of the living standard of the population, bringing a further degree of perfection to social relations, and enhancing the real humanism of the socialist system. One of the fundamental designs as regards the development of the living standard under the 8th Five-Year Plan is the acceleration of the rate of personal consumption and the implementation of qualitative changes in the structure. Population incomes are to rise by 14 percent, average nominal wages will increase by 6.5 percent.

Gustav Husak said that the system of social security, which is on a high level in Czechoslovakia and will be further improved depending on created economic potentialities, holds a permanently important position in social policy. In the 8th Five-Year Plan, work will start on a program of improving the system of pensions, with the aim to raise the living standard of pensioners. The network of social services and the welfare services covering elderly citizens and invalids will be expanded, as well as the scope of programs in aid of families with children and newly-weds. The current five-year period will see deliberations on the kind of conditions qualifying for the extension of holidays in the category of workers employed in strenuous jobs and shift-based workshops, and for the adoption of measures in favour of women with very young children.

The supply of goods to the market will grow by more than 13 percent during this 5-year plan period. The principles of the long-term pricing policy, adopted at the 16th party congress, will not be changed. The state subsidizes and will continue to spend large sums of money to keep down the prices of food and services in particular.

Gustav Husak said that external influences cannot be disregarded but, he added, Czechoslovakia will strive to prevent an automatic transfer of impacts of price variations on world markets into the sphere of consumption.

The general secretary said that the basic task in housing policy in the 8th 5-Year Plan period is to build 480,000 new flats and to make more progress in the modernization of the housing stock.

Environmental control is an urgent problem which has become global. Many aspects related to that cannot be dealt with at a national level, and they have become the concern of various international commissions in whose work Czechoslovakia takes an active part. In the current five-year plan period Czechoslovakia will allocate twice as much as in the 7th 5-Year Plan period to different environmental protection projects.

Gustav Husak said that one of the foremost tasks of the policy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party is care paid to the strengthening of the leading role of the working class and its union with cooperative farmers, the intelligentsia and other workers. The policy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party follows the steady line of developing and perfecting socialist democracy, of extending the participation of working people in dealing with state and public affairs.

Speaking about the role of the socialist state, about its federal system, Gustav Husak pointed out that the time has come to work out a new constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. A quarter of a century had elapsed since its adoption and developments since then have enforced a number of amendments in the form of constitutional laws which must be integrated into one single constitutional document.

The general secretary said that the party will pay continued attention to the strengthening of the security and defence capability of the socialist homeland. "We shall see to it that the Czechoslovak People's Army, in close alliance with the Soviet Army and other armies of the Warsaw Treaty, the armed units of the Ministry of the Interior and the People's Militia are thoroughly prepared politically and professionally and well supplied materially for ensuring reliable protection of socialist construction and the peaceful life of our people."

Speaking about the strengthening of socialist legality, Gustav Husak said "We shall allow no one to violate our laws, to undermine our political system, our socialist order, however lofty phrases he might use about freedom, democracy, and the so-called struggle for human rights."

He stressed that at present the party places increased demands on ideological work which should be channelled so as to make the people understand the strategy of its economic policy. The necessity of speeding up the transfer of the Czechoslovak economy to the path of intensification is indeed a revolutionary task whose present-day historical significance can be compared to socialist industrialization and collectivization of agriculture in the past. It is a task which is connected with the great effort to change people's thinking and their general psychology.

Education in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism is coming increasingly to the foreground, Gustav Husak said.

Imperialism is stepping up its psychological warfare which it has launched against the socialist countries, and is attempting to set one socialist country against another, above all against the Soviet Union. It praises the ones and reprobates the others, it tries to revive nationalism and chauvinism and even to misuse the religious feelings of citizens, Gustav Husak continues.

"We must not forget that Czechoslovakia is one of the countries that are exposed to particularly sharp attacks of anti-communist forces. Any lie is good enough for them to denigrate socialism, to depreciate results of our people's work, to falsify the history of our nations," he said and added that it is a permanent task of the party's ideological work to expose, with well-founded arguments, the mendacity of the campaigns of anti-communist centres, to convincingly demonstrate the advantages of the socialist system, socialist democracy, to clarify the humane character of revolutionary ideology, to spread the truth about socialism.

"The creation of favourable external conditions for the construction of an advanced socialist society remains a primary goal of Czechoslovak foreign policy. The authority and influence of Czechoslovakia in the world stem from a successful all-round development of our society, from our country's firm place in the socialist community." Gustav Husak said in another part of the report.

He pointed out that due to the aggressive militaristic policy of imperialism, the international situation is tense and threatens the very existence of humanity. "In their efforts to weaken socialism, to gain military and strategic superiority, even to attempt a social revenge, the imperialist circles, particularly the United States, escalate the arms race and step up their attempts to militarize outer space. From the position of strength they would like to dictate their will to states and nations, to prevent progressive development in the world," Gustav Husak said.

He stressed that this adventurous line is opposed by the consistent peace policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries aiming at the

stabilization of international relations, at the continuation of detente, at stopping the arms race, and at disarmament.

Gustav Husak went on to say that the program of peace adopted by the 27th Congress of the CPSU is a specific, integrated program whose aim is to free the world from nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, to establish permanent peaceful cooperation between nations and states with different social systems, and to build foundations of a comprehensive system of international security. It is a realistic, comprehensible and deeply humanistic program, representing the highest degree of responsibility for the future fate of human civilization.

"The peace program of the Soviet Union is a unique opportunity for mankind. If nations are to enter the next millenium free from fears about their future, this historical opportunity must not be wasted. Our party, all the Czechoslovak people fully support this program. We will use all our means and possibilities to make a most effective contribution to the implementation of this great peaceful prospect," Gustav Husak stressed.

The general secretary recalled that the international peace-loving public welcomed the renewal of a top-level dialogue between the USSR and the USA, and continued:

"Now it is necessary that words should be followed by deeds. It is this path that is pursued by the Soviet Union. It proved it by its concrete initiatives and unilateral measures, including the moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The whole world now rightly asks whether and when a realistic and responsible approach towards the solution of decisive international problems prevails also in the United States. The positions and practical steps of the U.S. Administration to date have shown that the ruling circles of the USA have not so far been willing to embark on the path of nuclear disarmament. However, the realities of the present-day world cannot be ignored. It is clear from them that neither a nuclear war nor the arms race can be won."

Strengthening friendship, systematic development and deepening of cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries, particularly with the Soviet Union, remain the primary tasks of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy. Today no question of world politics can be settled without the socialist community. From this follows the co-responsibility for strengthening its unity and cohesion, based on the joint Marxist-Leninist ideology and on the principles of socialist internationalism, said Gustav Husak.

The general secretary said the need for an accelerated and broader use of the advantages of socialism requiries seeking new more efficient forms of cooperation in all spheres, improving the mechanism and methods of work of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for the sake of ensuring defence, coordinating foreign policy and of an all-round development of socialist economic integration.

"Our entire path of socialist construction so far has proved the fundamental and lasting importance of the alliance, friendship and cooperation with the USSR for the vital interests of the Czechoslovak people, for ensuring the security of our state," Gustav Husak stressed.

He said Czechoslovakia attaches great importance to the solidarity and cooperation of all socialist countries. It is prepared to fully normalize and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with the People's Republic of China.

Czechoslovakia favours the further strengthening and development of equal relations and multifaceted cooperation with countries which liberated themselves from the colonial yoke and embarked upon the road of independent development. "We consider the liberated nations to be our friends and partners in the struggle for the cause of peace and progress. Together with them we shall strive for the liquidation of dangerous hotbeds of tension and for the transformation of international economic relations based on just democratic foundations," Gustav Husak said.

The general secretary added that Czechoslovakia resolutely rejects all forms of colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and apartheid. It appreciates the role of the non-aligned countries which, by their anti-imperialistic attitudes, by their struggle for the liquidation of nuclear weapons and for the elimination of the danger of war, and by their significant initiatives, help actively in dealing with acute international problems.

Gustav Husak condemned the policy of imperialism which in its aggressive global strategy misuses the economic dependence and enormous indebtedness of the developing countries, provokes conflicts, foments disputes and sows mistrust among nations. Transnational monopolies intensify their shameless exploitation of the developing countries. To this effect they utilize all sorts of means, from political, economic and military pressures, from organized support for counter-revolutionary forces and dictatorial anti-popular regimes up to the policy of state terrorism and direct military intervention. "We are deeply convinced that the attempts directed at halting progressive development in the developing world are doomed to failure," he said.

Gustav Husak said Czechoslovakia wishes to continue developing relations with capitalist states on the basis of equality, mutually advantageous cooperation and non-interference in internal affairs. It favours an open, honest and fruitful dialogue contributing to the creation of mutual confidence, to the strengthening of international security and to the invigoration of the process of detente in the spirit of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference. Incompatible with this are any manifestations of pressure, discrimination, sanctions or embargo. Czechoslovakia also denounces all revenge-seeking voices demanding a revision of frontiers and of the postwar order in Europe.

"We are of the opinion that even the most complicated problems between the capitalist and socialist countries can be solved by negotiations. Progress at the Vienna talks and at the Stockholm Conference would contribute to the consolidation of stability and confidence among European states. Given the good will on the part of all participants in these meetings, concrete positive results could be achieved within a short span of time. Such results would create prerequisites for the utilization of new, more intensive forms of all-European cooperation in all fields," Gustav Husak stated. He added that this would make it possible to confront more actively the serious problem of environmental protection. It is necessary to proceed rapidly from the exchange of views and multilateral exploration of this question to joint solutions and agreements.

Gustav Husak pointed out that security in Europe would benefit from the implementation of the joint initiatives of Czechoslovakia and the GDR to create a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe.

"We fully support the United Nations," Gustav Husak said.

He added that the international communist and workers' movement represents a significant political force in the struggle for peace, against the policy of imperialism and for the social transformation of the world. "We consider it our duty to support every initiative directed strengthening the class solidarity among fraternal parties, equal cooperation in the struggle for common objectives, for peace and socialism with due respect to the different tasks and conditions in individual parties' activities. We do not see the diversity of views concerning these or other questions as something unnatural. It emanates from different conditions of each party's activities, from diverse approaches to the solution of problems. In the interest of joint action we regard it necessary to develop bilateral contacts and multilateral forms of cooperation both on a regional or wider basis."

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak said, will continue developing and promoting an active dialogue and cooperation with social democratic and socialist parties, with the trade union movement, with all democratic forces advocating the policy of detente and peaceful cooperation among peoples. Ideological differences cannot constitute an obstacle to cooperation where the averting of war is concerned. Czechoslovakia will continue creating prerequisites for the Czechoslovak peace movement to take an increasingly active part in the struggle of the world peace and anti-war forces.

In another part of the report marked this year's 65th anniversary of the birth of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The party "Today represents a powerful political force enjoying great authority and trusted by the people. 1,675,000 communists are a great army active in all walks of life of our society. The attractiveness of the party policy is also documented by the permanent influx of new vigour to its ranks. The worker core of the party has been markedly reinforced.

Workers and cooperative farmers now constitute over 50 percent of the current membership. The party has grown younger, one-third of its members are communists under the age of 35."

Gustav Husak stressed that the duty of attending to the revolutionary, pure profile of the party, to the communist's good name, ranks among the most binding obligations bequeathed by the party's history. Demands on the work of communists are increasing in all spheres. It is particularly important to proceed openly, which includes the need for truthful assessments of situations, the ability to see shortcomings and errors but also being well-informed and having to account regularly for one's actions. The Leninist principle of collective leadership and personal responsibility must be applied everywhere.

In another part of the report Gustav Husak dealt with the problem of criticism and self-criticism. He said that without criticism and self-criticism it is impossible to imagine a healthy development, an atmosphere necessary for the exposure of shortcomings and mobilization of forces to overcome them. Communist criticism and self-criticism is a natural part of inner-party life, and indispensable tool of building advanced socialist society. However, it has nothing in common with demagoguery disparaging honest work and assaulting honest people.

Gustav Husak stated that the standard and effectiveness of control in political and managerial work must increase substantially. No one, irrespective of his ranks or assignment, can be immune from control.

"The party's leading role is the more effective, the richer is inner-party life and the more consistently is the Leninist principle of democratic centralism observed." Communists are members of a militant movement for a better and more socially just world. In this sense they strive for further consolidation of the political, organizational, ideological and action unity of the party, which is the basic prerequisite for implementation of challenging plans which are being discussed by the 17th party congress. The policy of the party is an honest one, expressing the interests of the working people and relying on their support.

In conclusion he expressed the conviction that the congress proceedings will be marked by an open, efficient and creative spirit, and will be imbued with a resolve to fulfill the new tasks being discussed by the congress. "The program we are outlining for the period ahead corresponds to the fundamental interests and aspirations of our working people and this program is in consonance with the endeavour of the world's revolutionary and progressive forces to secure social progress and lasting peace. Our resolve is even more intense in view of the fact that our country is a firm constituent of the socialist community, of the broad anti-imperialist front, and that we are carrying out our challenging plans in indivisible fraternal cooperation with Soviet Communists, with the Soviet people."

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POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

VACLAVIK ADDRESSES CPCZ CONGRESS ON ARMY'S ROLE

LD271247 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2030 GMT 26 Mar 86

["Part" of speech by Milan VACLAVIK, minister of national defense at the 26 March session of the 17th CPCZ Congress -- recorded]

[Text] Our army was built as a modern army, boundlessly devoted to the party and the people, as an inseparable part of the armies of the Warsaw Pact states, prepared along with them for the defense of the homeland and socialism. Consistent application of the leading role of the party is of crucial importance for further deepening the socialist character of our army and improving the standard of its combat readiness. The party pays special attention to the reinforcement of continuous influence of party-political work on all spheres of the life of the army, on the reinforcement of moral-political state of soldiers,, and on their Marxist-Leninist education and military professional standard.

With regard to the continuous aggressive militarist course of the reactionary forces of imperialism, from which follows the inevitability of further reinforcing the country's defense ability, we continue to equip the army with new, updated weapons and combat technical equipment in accordance with the economic possibilities of our state. I want to assure you, esteemed comrades, that the weapons entrusted to our army are in good hands. Cooperation with Czechoslovak People's Army with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact member states, particularly the Soviet Army, develops successfully. Making use of the experience and [word indistinct] Soviet military science is a well tried source of deepening the combat and political preparedness of our army.

The members of the army fully understand the demanding tasks of our national economy and selflessly help to fulfill them. Military construction, production and repair plants successfully fulfilled the tasks of the Seventh 5-Year Plan. Almost 40 thousand soldiers work actively in representative bodies and mass organizations of the National Front and take part in the defense-oriented education of the population.

We can report to the congress that the Czechoslovak People's Army conscientiously fulfilled the tasks set it by the party and the working people. It is a reliable power tool of our socialist state and a firm part of the allied armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states.

We express our thanks and gratitude to the CPCZ Central Committee, its general secretary and president of the republic, Comrade Gustav Husak, and the CSSR Government for continuously dealing with the Army's construction and preparations and for showing profound interest in its life and results and care for all-round welfare of its soldiers.

Comrades. High demands, which are the result of the strategic line of the party toward the acceleration of socioeconomic advancement of our society and toward a substantial improvement in the quality and efficiency of all work -- and this includes the sphere of securing the defense ability of the country and of socialism -- mobilizes our effort toward more energetically overcoming the weak spots of our activity and toward more thorough and general mastery of new tasks in the area of further reinforcement of the army's combat ability.

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POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ARMY POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION CHIEF ON CURRENT TASKS

AU251901 Prague TRIBUNA No 11 in Czech 19 Mar 86 pp 6, 7

[Article by Lieutenant-General Jaroslav Klich, chief of the Main Political Administration of the Czechoslovak People's Army: "Members of the Czechoslovak People's Army greet the 17th CPCZ Congress with Specific Deeds"]

[Excerpts] On the basis of a profound analysis of the development of the international situation, the 16th CPCZ Congress charged us with building the Czechoslovak People's Army as an inseparable part of the Warsaw Pact, as a highly modern army, boundlessly devoted to the party and the people and capable of successfully defending peace and the achievements of socialism together with the Soviet Army and the other armies of the Warsaw Pact member-states.

A comprehensive balance of the achieved work has enabled us to state on the eve of the 17th CPCZ Congress that, thanks to the honest and selfless work of commanders and political staff, of party and social organizations, as well as of the absolute majority of soldiers and of civil staff, a high combat ability and preparedness has been achieved in our army to fulfill its mission in the defense of our socialist fatherland and of the peaceful work of our citizens.

Favorable conditions for this responsible mission have been established for the members of the Czechoslovak People's Army. The CPCZ Central Committee and the CSSR Government devoted regular care to the Czechoslovak People's Army and dealt regularly with the key issues of its life and built-up. The responsible fulfillment of tasks during the joint exercises has consolidated further the international unity and cooperation with the Soviet Army and with the other armies of the Warsaw Pact member-states.

The purposefully carried out party-political work has efficiently affected the organization of army training and of military life, and contributed toward deepening the upbringing mission of the Czechoslovak People's Army.

Of course, the enumeration of these positive features does not mean that we are blind to certain mistakes, problems, and shortcomings which still

occur in our work in a number of instances, or that we ignore or excuse them. We are conducting a persistent and uncompromising struggle for a highly disciplined and organized army life. We are striving to eliminate from the barracks forever such unhealthy phenomena as, for instance, chicanery, uncomradely behavior, and sometimes even care for the soldier's everyday needs.

Currently the party organizations are concentrating their attention on the personal example of communists; on the responsible and enterprising fulfillment of tasks set by the order of the CSSR minister of national defense for troop training during the present training year; on the unambiguous support of the Army Command and the main Political Administration of the Czechoslovak People's Army in their effort to improve the quality of management and organizational work; and on consolidating discipline and eliminating certain mistakes and short-comings in work which have occurred in the past.

The deliberations of communists in the army prior to the 17th CPCZ Congress have documented their unity of views on the topical tasks of ideological upbringing activities among the army members. They stressed the essential need to have every party member behave in keeping with the scientific world outlook and the development of every soldier's personality, and the words and deeds of all party members, and particularly of the leading staff, be in total unity. From this viewpoint the standards and efficiency of ideological work, and especially its linkage with the specific tasks of the army, were now appraised far more critically and profoundly than in the past. Numerous measures were also adopted to enhance the efficiency of ideological upbringing work among the soldiers, particularly the efficiency of measures for propaganda and for mastering the conclusions of the 17th CPCZ Congress; for enhancing the study of the experience of the 27th CPSU Congress, the preparation of army members for elections to bodies of representatives; and for achieving a dignified welcome for the 65th anniversary of the CPCZ's establishment.

It can be stated that the army's party organization is firm in ideology, in organization, and in action, and that it has deepened its preparedness to conduct a successful struggle for the further realization of the party's policy in all places in the Czechoslovak People's Army.

The communists and other members of the Czechoslovak People's Army fully realize that the demands and claims placed on the quality of work of every one of us -- particularly those which follow from the development of the current international situation, which evokes serious concern and alarm -- are increasing. The imperialist states, headed by the United States with its militarist and aggressive policy, affirm that they still want to acquire military supremacy over the Soviet Union and its allies, and aim at changing the correlation of forces in the world in their favor. They do not take into account the political realities of the present; they are not striving to take a single practical step toward strengthening international security. On the contrary. They are organizing feverish

armament, accelerating the development of space arms, continuing to carry out nuclear explosions, deploying further guided missiles in Europe, and thus continuing preparations for a war against socialism; they are placing world peace in danger.

We are aware of the fact that the current international situation demands that the Czechoslovak People's Army continue consolidating its combat readiness, enhancing the political vigilance of formations and groups of units; and -- in international unity with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact member-states, particularly the Soviet Army -- it must be prepared to ward off any and all attempts to disrupt the peaceful construction work of our people and to protect the security and inviolability of our socialist fatherland and of the entire socialist community. We will be drawing strength and inspiration for the fulfillment of this mission from the conclusions of the 17th CPCZ Congress. For this purpose we will make use of the creative selfless work of every member of our army and of the high quality and initiative developed in honor of the congress deliberations and of the 65th anniversary of our party.

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POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRATISLAVA SEMINAR ON CPSU CONGRESS CONCLUSIONS

AU261714 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Mar 86 p 3

[CTK report]

[Text] Bratislava (CTK) -- A seminar on the conclusions of the 27th CPSU Congress, sponsored by the Slovak Central Committee of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, for the activists of its sections and commissions, and for secretaries of the regional and district committees of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society, for the activists of its sections and commissions, and for secretaries of the regional and district committees of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society in the Slovak Socialist Republic [SSR], was held in the SSR capital yesterday [18 March]. The seminar was attended by Nikolay Kuznetsov, consul of the USSR General Consulate in Bratislava and deputy of the representative of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The seminar was opened by Karol Savel, leading secretary of the Slovak Central Committee of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Society. He underscored the significance of the congress of the Soviet Communists which is, at the same time, a telling incentive for further strengthening the friendship and cooperation among the nations of the CSSR and the USSR. Yuriy Yemelianov, official of the Historical Institute of the International Workers Movement in Moscow, and a participant in the 27th CPSU Congress, informed those attending the seminar about the orientation of the Main Guidelines of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the 1986-90 Period and Up to the Year 2000. Vladimir Zheriobin, head of the Soviet lecturers teaching at Slovak university-level schools, provided a briefing on the content of the new edition of the CPSU Program.

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POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

FARMERS' DAILY CITES INDRA ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY

LD221131 Prague CTK in English 1005 GMT 22 Mar 86

[Text] Prague 22 March (CTK) -- The popular character of the Federal Assembly, the supreme body of state power in Czechoslovakia, was pointed out by its chairman Alois Indra, Presidium member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in an interview with the farmers' daily ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY today.

General managers or academicians could apparently be found in Bourgeois parliaments, just as in the Federal Assembly. "But you certainly will not find there one hundred workers or 51 farmers like here," Alois Indria noted.

Our socialist democracy "is not formal. Quite often colleagues from capitalist countries ask us how it is possible that the deputies mostly vote unanimously. We try to explain to them how agreements are reached through 'arguments,' in a good sense, in the committees where views on various problems clash so that control or legislative documents submitted to a plenary session have already been discussed and elaborated to the extent that the unity of vote is actually the logical result of the long-term creative and goal-oriented preparation in the committees" of the Federal Assembly's two chambers.

Alois Indra noted that the Federal Assembly, its chambers, committees and members have done good work in fulfillment of the tasks resulting from the 16th congress of the Communist Party, but this is not a reason for self-complacency.

"By approving 43 new laws we contributed to an improvement in the socialist legal order but this work could have been still better if we had achieved even broader participation of workers and National Front organizations and bodies in the creation, evaluation and observance of socialist laws. I regard this as one of the foremost tasks also for the coming term of office." Its urgency is confirmed by the practice of Soviet Communists who set it forth in the new edition of the CPSU Program, Alois Indra said.

He noted that next week's Czechoslovak Communist Party Congress will assess the work of the representative bodies and lay down new tasks for them. "However, it is already clear that the political and economic realities of the present time provide good preconditions for speeding up the economic and social development of our society in all spheres, and this also implies new possibilities of developing socialist democracy," Alois Indra stressed.

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POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

INTERVIEW WITH ALOIS INDRA

AU180909 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 13 Mar 86 p 4

[Interview given in Prague by Alois Indra, member of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly to RABOTNICHESKO DELO correspondent Georgi Monev, entitled: "The Chance Must Not Be Missed" -- date not given]

[Text] [Monev] During the past year and at the beginning of this year we have been witnesses to important international events which have had a strong influence on public awareness and which have given new impulses to the hope for preserving world peace and developing cooperation in Europe and throughout the world. The importance of this new process, which is unfolding more and more clearly against the background of the present and future development of international relations, was the subject of the conversation which I had with Alois Indra, member of the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee and chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly.

[Indra] In the development of history certain years are recorded more vividly in the memory of mankind. The Geneva summit meeting of the top leaders of the USSR and the United States created a new spirit in international life. The words "hope," "real chances for mankind," and other such words which are more and more closely linked with the implementation of the ideas of Geneva, have made a lasting entry into the dictionary of progressive and peace-loving people.

I would not wish to say that previously the world was without hope or chances. Quite the reverse. We, the communists, on the basis of scientific knowledge, are convinced of the happy future of mankind, which we are trying to build with all our powers. But a danger exists that the path toward this future will be cut off, and that life on the planet will even be completely eradicated in the event of a nuclear war. This is why we assess as of the utmost importance those events which contribute toward the consolidation of peace. I completely ascribe to the conviction of the peace-loving world public opinion that the results of the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan and the subsequent exceptionally important initiatives of the Soviet Union create an opportunity for mankind to make a decisive step to implement a historic turnabout from the arms race toward disarmament and elimination of the nuclear threat.

On the basis of the Geneva talks, the Federal Assembly of the CSSR in December 1985 expressed a standpoint that reflects the common opinion of the Czechoslovak citizens. The position of our people's representatives completely coincides with the address made by the USSR Supreme Soviet on this issue. The Federal Assembly gives a high assessment of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Geneva meeting, and to his contribution toward implementing the peace-loving policy of the countries of the socialist community. Particular stress was placed on the readiness expressed by both sides not to permit nuclear war to break out and not to strive toward military superiority.

[Monev] Without doubt, Comrade Gorbachev's declaration of 15 January 1986 is a concrete and lasting program for the realization of this lofty humanitarian goal.

[Indra] The Geneva meeting prepared the way for further talks at various levels for an overall improvement of international relations and for expanding cooperation between states with different social systems. The hopes bound up with its results now depend on the halting of certain practical actions by the United States, which are incompatible with what was said at Geneva. For this reason alone peoples throughout the world, including the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian peoples, enthusiastically accepted the notable initiative of the Soviet Union, which contains a concrete program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in three successive stages by the end of the century, for further improving the international climate, and for ensuring peaceful cooperation between states.

The proposals made by Comrade Gorbachev and supported by a further series of measures of the peace-loving Soviet foreign policy provide the world with the opportunity to be delivered from the risks of the occurrence of nuclear war and from the wasting of means on nuclear armament. The implementation of the Soviet proposals will enable us to put a halt to armament, to preserve space from militarization, gradually to achieve complete disarmament, and to utilize the means invested in this goal for the good and the advance of mankind. This fully corresponds to the interest and desire of the Czechoslovakian people. For this reason the CSSR is making an active contribution to the common efforts of the socialist countries. These efforts found expression in the concrete initiatives and proposals contained in the declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-states at the Sofia conference, as well as in the position expressed at the meeting of the top representatives of the fraternal socialist countries in Prague. This is why I warmly welcome the opportunities which these initiatives open up for the peoples, and believe that they will lead to positive results. I consider that they are of exceptional importance for strengthening peace and expanding cooperation on our continent and throughout the world. These chances must not be missed.

[Monev] It is well known that lately the role of the parliaments in international relations has been considerably enhanced. Are any new initiatives envisaged in International Peace Year?

[Indra] There is something symbolic in the fact that at the start of 1986, which has been declared International Peace Year by the UN, for the first time in history a program has been proposed for eliminating the weapons of mass annihilation. A concrete program, which can really be implemented within a short period. The task now is to mobilize all forces and to make a start this very year on practical actions to halt the arms race and strengthen peace. Particular responsibility falls on the parliaments in this crucial period.

In connection with your question, I would like to state that the Federal Assembly of the CSSR is activating the forces and capacities which it has at its disposal as the supreme representative organ in the country, and will utilize them for the aims of the peace-loving policy of the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union. We are consistently implementing this intention of ours when discussing the Czechoslovak Government's foreign policy and our various international treaties, when adopting a viewpoint toward the topical events in the world, and in our international links.

Of course, first and foremost we are deepening the mutual cooperation with the legislative organs of the socialist countries. We are also thinking of elucidating even more intensively the essence and the need of adopting measures to strengthen peace with developing links with the parliaments of other states. An example of this constructive approach is the peace-loving initiatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

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1 May 1986

POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

AL-'ATTAS DESCRIBES SITUATION IN PDRY

AU251706 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 21 Mar 86 pp 1, 7

[Interview given by Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, chairman of the Presidium of the PDRY Supreme People's Council, to RUDE PRAVO special correspondent Milan Madr: "Thanks For Assistance" -- in Aden on 20 March; first paragraph is paper's introduction]

[Text] Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, chairman of the Presidium of the PDRY Supreme People's Council, received in Aden on Thursday [20 March] RUDE PRAVO's special correspondent and gave him an interview on his country's present domestic and foreign policy.

[Madr] How does the process of consolidation proceed following the tragic January events?

[al-'Attas] One could say in general that life has become normalized. All service directly related to the life of the population have been restored. One has to heal the wounds caused, win people's trust, and strengthen their unity. We are striving to ensure housing for those who lost it in January. Our construction sector has been developing considerable efforts to repair damaged homes and objects.

[Madr] What about the extent of the damage?

[al-'Attas] To tell the truth, the damage was great. Some industrial projects were also damaged. We are ascertaining the extent of the damage in detail. A pledge movement is spreading throughout the country, with the objective to repair the material damage. It is natural that at present we must expand all our energy and capacities primarily on various repairs to the detriment of new construction undertakings. From this viewpoint we must reexamine the 5-year plan that began this year.

[Madr] What do you see as the most important political aspects of the present situation?

[al-'Attas] The January events have caused considerable damage in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy. We were able to give the socialist countries, the national liberation movement, and the Arab

countries a clearer picture of what happened in January. The 27th CPSU Congress provided the opportunity to meet with the highest representatives of the communist and workers parties of the whole world in an identical sense. We are also striving to improve relations with the Arab countries, especially with those who are our neighbors.

However, the most important thing is to heal the internal wounds. That includes tasks such as further consolidating our party -- the Yemeni Socialist Party -- restoring people's confidence, consolidating the armed forces, in short: Strengthening everything that is related to the domestic political activity.

[Madr] What main lessons has the party leadership drawn from the January events?

[al-'Attas] It has decided to analyze them in detail, pinpoint their background and roots with the objective of learning an appropriate lesson. One of the main causes of what happened in January is that some people were violating the principles of democratic centralism, and that individualist acts were spreading. For the future it is necessary to reinforce the principles of collective leadership and firmly oppose errors and incorrect practices.

[Madr] What is your opinion of the hostile campaign waged of late against the PDRV by the bourgeois information media?

[al-'Attas] Hostile circles have been waging a campaign against us ever since we gained independence, especially since the fourth congress of the National Liberation Front which determined the country's socialist orientation. Naturally, after the January events we expected the campaign against us to be escalated, and we think that it is still going to increase. We hear a lot of fabrications every day. The latest one: Allegedly there was a failed attempt on my life.

[Madr] I think that the unsubstantiated figures about the number of the victims of the January tragedy also serve that objective...

[al-'Attas] We consider the data published in the Western press to be considerably exaggerated. The number of dead did not exceed 2,000. There were about 700 wounded.

[Madr] Are you of the opinion that the patriotic and progressive forces in the Arab world will have enough energy to effectively oppose the American-Israeli pressure to assert a separate and capitulationist solution to the Middle East problem with the Palestinian issue as its core?

[al-'Attas] I believe they will. But only if they develop a common endeavor and strengthen their relations with the countries of the socialist community, above all with the Soviet Union. We see that the

pressure of imperialism and Zionism in that respect has been escalating and the situation has been deteriorating. However, it is certain that no capitulationist "solutions" will resolve the problem.

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In the closing part of the interview, the South Yemeni representative conveyed greetings to the Czechoslovak people, and thanked them and the CSSR government for humanitarian assistance. "We wish the upcoming 17th CPCZ Congress complete success and we are convinced that the relations of friendship and cooperation between our two countries will continue to deepen," he added.

Thanks for the interview.

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CSO: 2400/243

POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SEMINAR ON INSEPARABILITY OF SOCIALISM, DEMOCRACY

AU182054 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 14 Mar 86 p 2

[Text] Prague (CTK) -- A national seminar of lecturers of the CSSR's Socialist Academy on "The Inseparability of Socialism and Democracy" was held in Prague yesterday [13 March].

Lubomir Prochazka, CPCZ Central Committee department head, spoke at the seminar on the tasks of social organizations in preparing for the 17th CPCZ Congress and on elections to representative bodies. He stressed that the party's district and regional conferences have convincingly proved the unity, action capability, and preparedness of the CPCZ to resolve the new tasks connected with the intensification of our national economy and of the whole of social life. The experience acquired from the deliberations of Soviet Communists is of considerable significance in preparing the 17th CPCZ Congress.

He then spoke about the work of national committees and about their contribution to ensuring the performance of political and economic tasks and to satisfying the population's social and cultural needs. The CPCZ Central Committee department head called the task of developing political work, of consolidating the ties between the party and the people, of concluding the preparation of the National Front's election programs, of appraising in an exacting manner the activity of national committees, of ensuring the selection of candidates for deputies, and of preparing well the public preelection meetings, the most important thing in the preparation of elections to the representative bodies.

The National Front as the political expression of the union of workers, farmers, and the socialist intelligentsia, of all nations and nationalities, and its tasks at present -- this was the topic of the paper submitted by Tomas Travnicek, deputy chairman of the CSSR National Front Central Committee. He pointed out the all-popular nature of the National Front and the democratic principles both in the structure of its agencies and in its decisions. He then spoke about the need to orient political work toward further enhancing the citizens' participation in the creation, realization, and control of policy, and about the share of the National Front organizations in the economic and social development of our country.

Miroslav Spaniel, secretary of the Central Trade Union Council, dealt at the seminar with the issues of developing socialist democracy and the activity of working collectives. He emphasized the essential need of expediently orienting the working people's initiative toward the most important task of today -- the acceleration of progress in research and development as the basic intensification factor.

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CSO: 2400/243

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POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

EAST SLOVAK OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON IDEOEDUCATIONAL ACTIVITY

AU280947 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 19 Mar 86 p 4

[Statement made by Rudolf Biaho, secretary of the East Slovak Regional Committee of the Slovak Communist Party (CPSL) in Kosice, in the CPSL Congress discussion on 14 March in Bratislava]

[Excerpts] The results of our party's work considerably depend on the revolutionary, conscientious, and responsible manner with which the communists approach the fulfillment of party resolutions.

We say that no greater disaster could overtake us than to start being satisfied with the average, with what we have already achieved. Regrettably, we encounter such tendencies, and not seldom, either. We consider the decisive factor in the appraisal of the results of our ideo-educational work, and also of the entire party management work to be not merely a verbal avowal of adherence to the party line or its tasks, but the actual accomplishment of specific tasks aimed at achieving better quality in all work and production, aimed at efficiency, thrift, order, discipline, and the consistent utilization of the knowledge of science and technology in practice in every workplace.

The entire process of intensification is individually connected with a change in thinking, with the reorganization of the people's psychology, with a change in their style of work. The significance of conscientious work, morality, and political culture is growing, particularly among the executive cadres.

Our ideo-educational work can be efficient only if it is tied to social, and particularly production, practice. Only the essential interlinkage of production, management, and upbringing processes can lead to an accelerated development of intensification. From the management staff on all levels we will continue to demand greater responsibility for the Marxist-Leninist upbringing of their subordinates. Every leading staff worker must realize that he is responsible for the moral and political state, working discipline, and critical attitude to short-comings, whether he wants to be, or not.

A most topical task in the region is the task of offensively shaping the Marxist-Leninist scientific world outlook of all communists and non-members of the party, and particularly of our youth. We see an interesting phenomenon: An increasing number of people are adopting the scientific world outlook as their own. The party is growing in number, as well as in its influence at every workplace and in the families. At the same time, under the influence of the reactionary policy pursued by the Vatican and by certain circles of the Church hierarchy, we see increased activity among some religious believers. We encounter open endeavors to abuse the believers' religious sentiments, with the aim of weakening the moral and political unity of our socialist society. We are purposefully warding off these endeavors by emphasizing a comprehensive approach to these complicated problems, but also by conducting purposeful individual work in schools, families, and workplaces. We are stressing the communists' responsibility for the upbringing of their children. According to research carried out, the number of members of the younger generation with an atheist orientation is something like 50 percent; in comparison with the past, this can be considered a success. On the other hand, however, we have a whole number of problems, shortcomings, and reserves for achieving even better results. Instead of a global, plenary activity we need more specific, individual work, particularly in schools.

We in the region feel responsible for youth's upbringing in the spirit of socialism. We think it is a mistake not to plan a youth club for a large settlement with 20,000-30,000 inhabitants within the norms of comprehensive housing construction. We say that we are a region of young people and youth. In the future, too, we will devote all-round care to young people, particularly in the Socialist Youth Union and its Pioneer Organization, on the level of party agencies and organizations.

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1 May 1986

POLITICS

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CONCERN ABOUT VALUES SHARED BY YOUNG PEOPLE

Prague HALO SOBOTA in Czech 1 Mar 86 p 2

[Interview with Dr Antonin Velehradsky, Dr Pavel Krejci and Vratislav Pavlik, staff workers of the Institute of Psychology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Science: "Some Bad Phenomena Among Our Youth"; date of interview not given]

[Text] Of the many letters reaching DELNICKE SLOVO [a column in HALO SOBOTA], a large number of them deal with the problem of the values of our contemporaries--and primarily in connection with our young people. These letters deal with the question as to what extent young people accept or possibly reject the idea of acting as socialist individuals. We selected some of these letters and held a round-table discussion with the staff workers of the Institute of Psychology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Docent Dr Antonin Velehradsky, CSc, and Dr Pavel Krejci from the Department of Social Psychology; and with Vratislav Pavlik, secretary of the Prague 9 District Committee of the Socialist Youth Union.

[Question] How is it possible that certain young people who grew up in comfortable circumstances fail to appreciate certain values? They are rude to their elders and when they talk among themselves they do not use polite language. . . .

Pavlik: It is true that while nobody pays any attention to numerous good deeds and does not write about them, people immediately notice all kinds of excesses. However, I often ask myself a question as to why adults fail to interfere, why they only shrug their shoulders or wave a hand when faced with an erring adolescent. In my opinion, it is not wise to reproach young people with the statement that they live quite well, while under capitalism there is hunger. After all, not only today's younger generation but even their parents have grown up following the defeat of capitalism in Czechoslovakia. . . .

Krejci: When we in the family give money to our child, this gift is no guarantee of his positive development. And this is even more valid when applied to society as a whole. Material abundance by itself does not guarantee anything in the case of our youth.

[Question] Don't you want to say a few words about the ideals our young people have?

Velehradsky: We often tell our young people what we have done for them, what they have, and that we expect gratitude. . . We want them to accept our ideals. However, we are not adequately creating the conditions for our young people to reach their own conclusions themselves, to learn on their own the true value of these ideals. And we often do not serve as a good example. A good example is the best teacher.

Pavlik: Young people create some barriers with their lack of interest expressed by oft-repeated arguments and especially cliches. . . I think that the most important thing is to create among young people an awareness that the abundance in which we live is a result of responsible and creative work and that even they must accept a share of responsibility. We must be able to appreciate their abilities, efforts, and give them sufficient opportunity to assert themselves. Otherwise their knowledge and abilities will be wasted.

[Question] Let us take a look at other letters. Their authors write that the young people see only a few good role models or that they choose very bad ones. A reader from Plzen even wrote us about his shocking experience when a group of youngsters sided with the bad guys on the screen while a war movie was being shown.

Velehradsky: We are increasingly reaching the conclusion that the negative elements in the behavior of some of our youth are caused by short-comings and formalism in our political-educational work. We are often unwilling to admit certain facts. We often assert in good faith that these facts are more favorable, more pleasant, in other words that they are as we want to see them. But the young people see things in a more sober way. To them, everything seems to be overorganized and often, regretfully, stuffy as well. They lack the aforementioned opportunity for their own initiative and activity. Let's take an example: Some youth are brought into a movie house to see a mandatory film projection. The film is shown and they are taken back to school. And this is all. When they are unable to understand what the film was about, when they cannot distinguish the good from the bad in the proper light, then we should not complain about the results. . . This does not mean that I am apologizing for these youngsters from Plzen whose behavior must not be tolerated under any circumstance.

[Question] What is the situation with regard to popularizing heroes and role models in general?

Pavlik: Each period has its own heroes. For example, I believe that by itself there is nothing wrong when our young people today admire various singers or music groups. What is important is that they know that the successes of the best performers are the result of hard work. I would like to add that we do not know how to popularize heroes on the labor front, simple, self-sacrificing people. True, we have plenty of them and they are very busy. But unfortunately they do not act as educators of our young people even where their example could have been the most effective.

Krejci: I think that when a young individual becomes a member of society, at the outset the most dominant feature is leisure activities. Thus, our young people in fact logically choose their role models from the field of entertainment or sports. In other words, the success of a singer or a soccer star leads our youngsters to emulate them. The fact that work plays an ever-increasing role in the life of each individual should lead to a situation where young people must search for other role models, this time from their immediate environment, perhaps at their workplace.

Velehradsky: You know, our scientific world opinion is based on reason, rational thinking. However, a young individual also lives--and usually very much so--by emotions. And here he is naturally closer to singers with their romances than to an older, however exemplary, worker in his field of specialization. At the same time, television shows singers more often than it shows excellent young scientists or workers who are heroes of labor. Only if we are able to affect the emotions of our young people will we be able to win them over for a certain type of work and consequently contribute to the overall maturing of their personalities in the spirit of our ideas. But this cannot be achieved by speeches alone.

Krejci: I would also like to say a word about the age of the people who should serve as examples and role models for our young people. In my opinion, other young people have the best chance to be accepted by the younger set. In other words, it is very important to assign early responsible tasks to able, qualified, and active youth in order to make it possible for them to grow with their tasks and serve as role models for their peers. Constant complaints that our young people are not active enough or are active in the wrong way is not enough. It is necessary to create real prerequisites for their activities.

I would think for a moment about an assertion one often hears, namely, that certain young people are unable to show enthusiasm for a cause involving the entire collective, that they lack some kind of an impersonal goal which would elevate them above the stereotypes of everyday work. The question is whether young people can always be aware of our common ideas because of the conditions in which they live. Whether we are able to always and everywhere make these ideals accessible to them on the basis of the knowledge of their mentality and understanding is a good question.

Moderator Ladislav Kapek: The problems about which we are talking are, however, complex and sensitive. It would be difficult to cover everything in one-short round-table discussion. Nevertheless, let's view this discussion as an effort to stimulate our readers to think about the problem. Thank you for your participation and views.

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POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BRIEFS

GORBACHEV CONGRATULATES HUSAK--Moscow 28 March (CTK)--The confidence given by you by Czechoslovak Communists testifies to your great authority in the party and among the people, the recognition of the significance of your contribution to the elaboration and implementation of the political line of the Czechoslovak Communist Party with which the successes of socialist Czechoslovakia and its high prestige in the international sphere are linked. This point was stressed in a congratulatory telegram sent by Soviet Communist Party General Secret Mikhail Gorbachev to Gustav Husak on his election of general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet people know your merits for the strengthening of Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship and the unity and mutual cooperation of the states of the socialist community. The 17th Czechoslovak Party Congress proved the determination of Czechoslovak Communists to continuously strive for the strengthening of this friendship and our fraternal alliance in the interest of the two countries and their nations and the whole socialist community. The Soviet Communist Party and Soviet working people will make every effort to achieve this goal. [Text] [Prague CTK in English 1400 GMT 28 Mar 86] /12640

GERMAN WORKERS'S ROLE--Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 13 March carries on page 2 a 700-word article by Teodor Hudecek entitled "We Commemorate the 65th Anniversary of the Establishment of the German Division of the CPCZ; Taking the Path of Internationalism." Hudecek begins by saying that "in the process of founding the international CPCZ, a significant role was also played by the revolutionary part of the German proletariat living on the territory of our state. Its core were the workers in Northern Bohemia, a milieu with a traditionally revolutionary orientation where the left-wing stream began to be shaped even prior to World War I." After reviewing the development of the German revolutionary workers movement in the country and the conflicts with the right-wingers in the German Social Democratic Party, which led to a split in 1921, Hudecek concludes: "Even despite certain shortcomings which were manifested in the search for ways and means to resolve the basic problems of the workers movement, the [1921] congress was a victory of the German, but also the entire Czechoslovak proletariat. By adopting a firm class and international position, by grasping the revolutionary nature of the changes in Soviet Russia and expressing their unconditional support for them, the German workers sped up the process which led to the emergence of the United CPCZ." [Editorial Report] /12640

CSO: 2400/243

1 May 1986

POLITICS

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SPEECH BY USSR'S ARISTOV AT LEIPZIG FAIR

AU261511 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 17 Mar 86 p 6

["Speech by Boris Aristov" on the occasion of the visit of the GDR party and state leadership to the USSR stand at the Leipzig Fair on 16 March]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Erich Honecker, dear comrades and friends:

Permit me to thank you for inviting the Soviet Government delegation to visit the Leipzig fair.

Please accept the most cordial greetings and best wishes of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers to the SED Central Committee, the State Council, the government, and the fraternal people of the GDR, and to you personally, esteemed Comrade Honecker.

Just a week ago the 27th CPSU Party Congress concluded its work. It was an event of world-historic significance. The ideas contained in the political report of the CPSU Central Committee to the party congress and in the new party program are of utmost importance for our country. The party congress worked out a scientifically founded comprehensive program to accelerate our country's socioeconomic development on the basis of scientific-technological progress.

This program determines for years and decades the nature as well as the speed of our advance on the way to communism. The supreme goal of this strategic line is to steadily increase the welfare of the people and create favorable conditions for the free and harmonious development of personality.

The party congress showed that the CPSU is a party of social progress and peace, that it has no more important goal than to safeguard peace on earth and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

The approved general line of the party's domestic and foreign policy, the line of accelerating the socioeconomic development of the country, of consolidating peace on earth, is the main political event of the 27th CPSU Congress.

The ideas of the party congress will be an active contribution to further consolidating the fraternal socialist alliance, to the development of the communist and workers movement, to the struggle of the peoples for peace, economic and social progress.

The Soviet Union fulfills the tasks to improve developed socialism in the fraternal alliance with the countries of the community of socialist states, which are united by the common aspects of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the basic interests and goals, and which develop their relations on the basis of the tested principles of socialist internationalism.

As the new CPSU program, which was approved by the 27th Party Congress, stressed, the party considers "the consistent joining of the efforts of the fraternal countries toward the key directions of production intensification and toward the acceleration of scientific-technological progress for jointly solving the tasks of historic scope, for achieving the world level in science and technology in order to further raise the welfare of its people and to strengthen security" of particular importance.

The fraternal relations between the USSR and the GDR are an outstanding example of cooperation.

The firm and comprehensive relations in politics, economic affairs, culture and other fields of societal life, which were established more than 35 years ago, are a remarkable achievement of the CPSU and the SED, of the peoples of our socialist countries.

The main directions and prospects of cooperation between the USSR and the GDR are determined at the meetings between our parties' leading representatives, Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Comrade Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council.

The development of the national economies of the USSR and the GDR is characterized by the high level of integration.

Implementing the currently more than 200 long-term state and ministerial agreements on scientific-technological and industrial cooperation in various fields serves the further consolidation and deepening of our countries mutual relations. The accelerated increase of mutual goods deliveries is determined by the active application of such progressive forms as international production specialization and cooperation, joint construction of integration projects, granting of technical support in building industrial enterprises, their modernization and reconstruction, etc.

Guided by the decisions of the economic talks of the CEMA countries at the highest level, the USSR and the GDR make an important contribution to deepening socialist economic integration.

In line with the long-term program of development of the cooperation between the USSR and the GDR in the fields of science, technology, and production for

the period up to the year 2000, joint efforts are made to further accelerate scientific-technological progress and to widely utilize its results for economic intensification. Particular attention is paid to implementing measures for further improving the structure of both countries' national economies and to the division of labor which has developed between the USSR and the GDR.

In summary, it is to be pointed out that our cooperation is aimed at achieving a qualitatively new level in both countries national economies. During the current 5-year plan period we will concentrate on problems of specialization and cooperation in science, technology, and production, of expanding and renewing the range of products and equipment that are to be mutually delivered. The development and production of microelectronic products and industrial robots, flexible manufacturing systems and processing centers, computer and information technology, and new construction materials will take place at a very fast rate. Their application in our countries national economies will make it possible to ensure a high growth rate in labor productivity and complex mechanization and automation of production, and to save energy, raw materials, and other materials.

The results of overall creative cooperation, which is aimed at achieving the highest targets in the most important economic sectors, were reflected in the long-term agreement recently concluded between our countries for the 1986-90 period. The exchange of commodities agreed on for this period will surpass R82 billion and will increase by almost 30 percent compared with the past 5-year plan period.

In solving tasks of socialist and communist construction, we always let ourselves be guided by Lenin's principles of foreign policy and by the course toward safeguarding peace, which has been worked out in the alliance with the fraternal parties of the socialist countries. Our countries are actively struggling against the threat of a nuclear war, for the reduction of armaments, and for real progress in easing the tensions of the international situation.

General interest and great hope all over the world was caused by the statement given by Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January 1986, which puts forth comprehensive new foreign policy initiatives aimed at averting the danger of a nuclear inferno and aimed at initiating a basic improvement in world politics. It is the most comprehensive, complex program aimed at fully and finally freeing the planet of nuclear, chemical, and other mass destruction weapons by the year 2000.

By implementing the Soviet program for a step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons and other peaceful proposals, which were explained in the political report by the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress, a totally new situation for international economic cooperation can be created. The Soviet Union does not shy away from any efforts to improve the international situation, to support and strengthen the relations of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between all states, irrespective of their social system.

Esteemed comrades, permit me to wish the SED and the entire GDR people from the bottom of my heart new successes in preparing for the 11th SED Congress.

We also wish a successful and creative course to the Leipzig fair, which is a true show of industrial and scientific-technological progress in the world.

May the unshakable unity and friendship between our peoples be further consolidated and developed.

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POLITICS

HUNGARY

YOUTH LURED INTO KISZ MEMBERSHIP WITH APARTMENTS, AUTO CLUB

Budapest NEPSZADABSAG in Hungarian 22 Feb 86 unnumbered supplement entitled "Youth"

[Interview by Tibor Borzak with Gabor Takacs, secretary of the municipal KISZ committee in Kiskoros, entitled "Instigators in Kiskoros"; date and place not indicated]

[Excerpts] ...The youth center was ready by last November. One looked around and saw that we had created an inner space which is esthetic and satisfies all demands. This required money, and we received it....

[Question] As far as I know, the center will continue to expand.

[Answer] The plans have already been completed. Take a look at them: the building will be enlarged by 400 square meters; we will open a small lecture room, an interior decoration store, and a pottery studio.

[Question] And your [other] undertakings?

[Answer] Our most significant action, the apartment construction for KISZ began two years ago. Those youths who are members of KISZ can acquire apartments under favorable conditions. (Of course, many people quickly joined...) We undertook the construction of a unit with 24 apartments, and we gained 40 new KISZ members. Of course, this is not the essence of the undertaking.

[Question] What then?

[Answer] Inexpensively acquired building lots, blueprints prepared free of charge, and subsidy in the amount of forty thousand forints - continues Jozsef Major, an architect and member of the municipal KISZ committee....

They Produce and They Sell

[Question] There is also a clothing boutique in the youth center. Perhaps that also belongs to the KISZ? - again I ask Gabor Takacs.

[Answer] Yes, we signed a contract with the RUBIN Company of Kalocsa. Soon we are planning to open similar shops in various cities of the country. We

also held discussions with the Computing and Management Organizing Company, and they will also be present in our center. The young artists in our pottery studio enjoyed their first success....

[Question] Well, what simple ideas! Will these be the functions of the KISZ in the future?

[Answer] I will not deny that we will continue to pay a great deal of attention to [similar] enterprises in the future, too. We have discovered new forms in our movement; youths have grouped themselves according to areas of interest. We have an auto club, an environmental protection club--this group has already won awards in 14 national competitions--and a folkdance branch organization of KISZ....

[Question] What do you consider your biggest success?

[Answer] Our auto club attracted 80 people within one year. They ended a remarkable year; they won national championships. All of this under the aegis of the KISZ. They received all the support they needed, and it was not necessary to explain to them why KISZ exists. I believe that it is necessary to create situations favorable for the young, and to give them equal opportunities. What I am especially glad about: we have more friends than people who resent our success.

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POLITICS

POLAND

PRE-CONGRESS MEETINGS

Lomzy on Intellectuals' Participation

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by Alicja Zagorska: "Plenum of the Lomza Provincial PZPR Committee: The Intellectual Strength of the Party"]

[Text] (Own information) What has gone wrong that we have so many minimalists that take what they feel to be the safest position of not sticking their necks out? Maria Chabarek, a teacher who attended the 6 March meeting of the Lomza provincial party organizations and took part in discussions on the role and tasks of intellectuals in ideological and educational aspects of work, searched for an answer to this question in the lack of criteria for evaluating worker attitudes.

The white-collar workers of Lomza province are comprised of about 3000 engineers, 1200 agricultural and forestry specialists, 3170 economists and 5000 teachers. About 8000 of these people are party members but within this community can we see the party organizations to which they belong? Are they influential enough to involve white-collar workers in the province's growth? Is the intellectual potential of these professional groups put to use enough in management and in public life? These are the questions that were answered by the participants to the plenary discussions.

Until just recently, teachers, the largest white-collar community, were the leading group of the province's social aktiv, especially in the rural areas. This is no longer true at this time. A large number of teachers are clearly seen as being isolated from the problems of their community and public activity, even within the schools themselves. An outward example of this is the number of empty seats in most schools on free Saturdays.

"How can we expect commitment if the graduates of schools of higher learning bring their discontent with them into the teaching community?" asked Dr Witold Wincenciak, director of teacher studies.

The University of Young Intellectuals, initiated a week ago by the provincial party secretariat, was supposed to encourage more active attitudes among young

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teachers. Even though the speeches were addressed primarily to young teachers, they have been made available to all.

Jan Nowak, the representative for technical white-collar workers, analyzed the reasons for the drop in public activity among young engineers whose full creative verve only comes after they finish school and begin professional life. In his opinion, this has been caused by a lack of faith in the knowledge of young graduates and a desire to avoid any inconvenience in some places of employment. The effects of such attitudes among businesses have already come to be felt.

The plenary session was chaired by the first secretary of the Lomza Provincial PZPR Committee, Mieczyslaw Czerniawski. The director of the provincial committee's Social and Professional Department, Stanislaw Gabrielski, and the deputy director of the PZPR Central Committee Ideological Department, Janusz Janicki, took part in this meeting.

Self-Governing Bodies Commission Meeting

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 7 Mar 86 p 2

[Article by J. Mik.: "Meeting of the PZPR Central Committee Commission on Representative Organs and Self-Government: Draft of a PZPR Program: The Party in the Rural Cooperative Movement"]

[Text] (Own information) The meeting of the PZPR Central Committee Commission on Representative Organs and Self-Government on 6 March was opened by Deputy Politburo Member and Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak. In connection with membership changes made by the 24th Plenum, the commission elected as its chairman Kazimierz Barcikowski, member of the Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the Council of State.

The first subject discussed at the Thursday meeting was the draft for the PZPR program or to be more exact, the fifth chapter on the development of the socialist political system. The introduction to discussions was given by Sylwester Zawadzki who stated that: "In this chapter of the draft, we are trying to answer the question of how to strengthen the role taken by the political and legal superstructure in the process of changes now occurring in our country. We wish to see political and legal institutions better serve to free public initiative and arouse a feeling among people that they are also responsible for running the country".

We see promise in this statement that the processes of democratization will continue. This also indicates that greater democracy is an objective need for growth. Continuation of democratization is above all understood as being the improvement of the recently-established practices used by many institutions of democracy. The proposed intention of the program draft is to strengthen representative forms of democracy and self-government. The growth in institutions of democracy must be accompanied by a stronger socialist state.

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The introduction to the meeting and the ensuing discussions considered unfavorable phenomena that are hindering the growth of democratic forms of government. The growth of democracy demands a stronger administration. Theoretical reports and the search for practical solutions to for the growth of self-government continue to be important. In many establishment, self-government has been crippled because its was not fully explained to every employee. We must also take great care to avoid creating obstacles to the growth of self-government by abusing such charges in the justified condemnation of particularism. We must also patiently act to bring democratic institutions to life.

In the next point on the agenda, the commission referred to its 1983 conclusions on the work of party members in rural cooperative organizations. The introduction to discussions was speeches by PZPR provincial party committee secretaries from Kielce (Jaroslaw Motyka), Leszno (Tomasz Skorupski) and Slupsk (Stanislaw Witoslawski).

The correctness of the idea adopted several years ago of creating party sections in the cooperative supervisory councils was upheld. These councils are functioning better on the provincial level but much remains to be done within individual communities.

The current problems of cooperatives were also more broadly discussed. Comrade K. Barcikowski stressed the importance of the cooperatives as a lasting form of social organization that has accomplished a great deal. We must create favorable conditions for its growth and improvement and more efficient party work in cooperative self-government should foster this.

As its last point of business, the commission listened a report by Witold Gadomski, deputy director of the Central Committee Political Organization Department, about special regional subdivisions (beyond the usual division into communities and provinces) and how they influence the functioning of communities. This is an unusually complicated problem requiring study and careful consideration. A team was established to propose methods of studying this problem.

Legnica Hosts Secretaries

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Mar 86 p 2

[Text] A conferences of the secretaries of departmental and primary party organizations was held in Legnica on 4 March under the slogan: "Our goal -- to work together to prepare a party program, properly greet the party congress and reinforce the ranks".

Discussions were centered around the most important tasks set by the draft of the PZPR's Program and the possibilities for realizing these tasks under the conditions found in Legnica Province. Attention was drawn to the sincere and open nature of both the party meetings held during the pregress campaign

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as well as individual conversations. It was stressed that many nonpartisan individuals also took part in debate over the draft of the program. It was remarked that the program is an ambitious one and that it will be difficult to realize without the commitment of all of society. A characteristic statement was made by one of the workers of the Cedynia copper rolling mill: "The program should not be just a set of promises. If we have to, we must narrow it down enough to make it feasible".

"The goals that we have set ourselves," said one participant, Vice-Premier Zbigniew Szalajda, "unfortunately cannot be adequately covered by the resources that we have at hand. Therefore, during the current 5-year period, we must maintain the best ratio between investment funds and consumer funds".

The vice-premier reminded listeners that the preliminary concepts of the social and economic plan for the period up to 1990 call for a 19-percent increase in national income. If we are to achieve that, we must increase industrial production by 16 percent and exports by 30 percent. Z. Szalajda emphasized that the main barrier to economic growth is a shortage of resources and materials and that we must limit their consumption.

It was stated at the conference that the pregress campaign has mobilized workers to a greater effort and to take on greater production responsibilities.

Marian Orzechowski, a deputy member of the Central Committee Politburo and minister of foreign affairs, spoke about the historical significance and the social and political role of the party program. He stated that in its most recent version, the program has become an outline for party strategy and the basis for the growth of our country. That is why national discussion of the draft for this program is so important.

Meeting Emphasizes Youth Participation

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8-9 Mar 86 p 2

[Author's name illegible: "Before the 10th PZPR Congress: If the Necessary Became Possible"]

[Text] (Own information) The condition of youth and youth organizations before the 10th PZPR Congress is in briefest terms what formed the subject of discussion at the Friday meeting called by the Party Section of the PZPR Central Committee which consists of party members from the central bureaus of socialist youth unions. Their most important task was to find an answer to the question of what must be done to make possible for the younger generation everything that is necessary for it.

Leszek Miller, director of the Department of Youth, Physical Education and Tourism referred to the documents of the 24th Central Committee Plenum and pointed out that youth organizations should very soon concentrate their

efforts above all on the issues that have been left untouched or dealt with in an unsatisfactory manner. These are problems such as the educational functions of places of work, strengthening the socialist educational front, the participation of young people in the administration of the party, unions and self-government, the management of free time for youth, overcoming social sicknesses and improving the social and material situation of young families.

Speaking about the party's search for new members, L. Miller stated that out of the 63,000 candidates that entered the PZPR last year, 31,000 of these were young people. More than 14,000 of them were recruited from the ranks of youth organizations. This means that more than half of the party candidates were not connected in any way with the youth movement.

Organizations must guide pregress discussion in such a way as to activate young party members and to encourage the growth of an intellectual movement of young communists within the youth movement. They must also see that the discussions create a dialogue between the party and young people because the party's program is, after all, a letter to the young generation.

During discussions, Jan Krzeminski (Union of Polish Socialist Youth) said: "We do not have to be activated. We have in our attitudes shown for years now what we can afford. Of course, one does find passive persons within the party. Since nothing will change them, maybe it would be useful to reduce the size of the party organization in order to rebuild and expand it the right way after another two years. I myself am for this because there is no other way to improve the quality of the rank-and-file membership".

Jerzy Lubieniecki (Rural Youth Union) talked about the causes of poor youth activity within the party. "In rural areas," he said, "the primary party organization members are people that joined the PZPR in the 1950's or 1960's. Their problems, pensions and retirement, mean nothing to young people. Young people prefer to join village councils because they know that this is where their problems, village problems, are resolved. Let's join these 'old' organizations, make them ours and use them to take care of problems that are important to young people".

Deputy Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak took part in the discussions.

He said: "We have spoken about many issues today but we failed to come to one conclusion -- how to limit inflation. We talked about educational investments and there is a shortage of 4000 schools. Every new school costs a solid one billion zlotys. The shortage of hospital beds is another matter along with cultural and scientific investments. I am not against these but let us be aware of what we are demanding because we do not have enough money for everything. These problems must be shown to our youth. I would like to appeal that you do not stop your work on building up a program. Let it be one acceptable to all of society including the young generation.

The discussion was summarized by the chairman of the meeting, Central Committee Secretary Waldemar Swirgon.

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PZPR COMMISSIONS, AKTIVS MEET

Law, Order Commission on Social Pathology

Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 22-23 Feb 86 p 2

[Text] On 21 February, the PZPR CC Commission on Law and Law-and-Order deliberated in Warsaw. Questions related to battling the phenomena of social pathology and to increasing the impact of socialist moral standards on interpersonal relations were discussed. Reports also were given on the results of the work of the Worker-Peasant Inspectorate in 1985 and on the directions of its work this year. The commission elected PZPR CC Secretary Jozef Baryla as its chairman.

In the extensive and lively discussion, in which 22 persons participated, including commission members and the representatives of interested ministries and institutions, the directions of work from 1986 to 1990 in the area of stepping up the struggle for moral health and for the strengthening of law and order and the principles of socialist ethics were discussed. Especially those dangers that cause departures from the generally recognized moral standards were noted. Not only are drunkenness, alcoholism, drug abuse and social parasitism reckoned among these, but also an unreliable attitude to work, waste and uneconomical management, the slackening of family ties, the reduction of the influence of the home and the school on child and youth upbringing and the breakdown of interpersonal relations at the workplace and in the home.

It likewise was determined that the creation of an ever broader plane of social cooperation will foster better results in the struggle with the ills and degenerativeness that plague society that are so troublesome in public and private life. There is a role here for all people of action, good will and social concern.

'Polish Socialism' Stressed by Aktivs

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 24 Feb 86 p 2

[Text] The joint discussion of the ideological, intraparty and socioeconomic problems presented in the PZPR draft program was the primary purpose of a 2-day meeting of the party aktiv of the Lodz and Katowice PZPR organizations that concluded on 22 February in Lodz. Both organizations have been cooperating

for several years, exchanging experiences on work among the highly industrialized working class.

On 21 February, the members of the Katowice delegation visited textile workers at their workshops in five factories: the J. Marchlewski and F. Dzierzynski Cotton Fabric Plants, the J. Niedzielski Woolen Fabric Plant, the A. Prochnik Clothing Plant and the VERA Furniture Covering Products Plant. Working conditions were discussed and workers' issues were talked over with workforce representatives.

Many of the topics discussed during these talks recurred on the second day of the meeting, during the discussion held at an ideological conference that took place at the Lodz BISTON Knitting Industry Plant. The discussants split up into three groups and talked over the ideological, the intraparty and the socioeconomic problems contained in the PZPR draft program.

Adam Kaluzak, PZPR KW instructor in Katowice, said: "A tremendous value of the draft is the definition of the road to socialism under Polish conditions. The draft answers many questions that have been asked within the PZPR since the beginning of its existence." Andrzej Witkowski, instructor for the Katowice provincial echelon, concurred with this statement. He said: "The foundation of all programs in our system should be the criterion of the social propriety of tasks undertaken. The party bears the responsibility for setting forth what society needs today and tomorrow. It also must keep a check on the implementation of plans that are adopted." Bohdan Jachowicz, secretary of the Lodz center-city KD, said: "In order for the party to perform this task, its program must be addressed to the entire nation. Thus, everything possible must be done to enable the broadest possible masses of society to take part in the discussion of this program. This will enable the inclusion in it of all content of importance to the nation."

It was stated that in Poland's current situation, ideological issues must be tied in closely with socioeconomic issues. In many fields, progress is impossible unless the same importance is attached to economic-technological questions and questions of human attitudes, awareness and knowledge. This is the case in construction, for example, about which Edward Krol, foreman at the Lodz Plumbing Enterprise, spoke. "It is not merely a question of the attitudes of the direct implementors of construction tasks," he said, "but also of the work of those that are in a position to eliminate effectively present obstacles in the construction ministry and in enterprise management, obstacles such as bureaucracy, indolence, incompetence and passivity."

Participants in the discussion stressed that the attitudes of party members are a necessary condition for the success of its program. Even the best defined goals, while they are attractive, socially necessary and realistic, do not mean anything if they are not implemented effectively. As always, people decide this. This truth was stressed many times during the conference. One of the discussants even used the statement: "the party must be elite, but its elitism should reside in the fact that party members are the most valuable representatives of society, and of the working class above all, people endowed with knowledge, ideologically, actively committed to building socialist Poland."

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Participants in the Lodz ideological conference decided to send materials and recommendations from the 2-day discussion to the PZPR leadership. They treated them as a joint voice of the Lodz and Katowice party organizations in the pre-congress discussion.

The Katowice PZPR Provincial Organization was represented by 45 members and 90 leaders, plus Tadeusz Czechowicz, Politburo member, PZPR KL first secretary. Likewise, a group of 30 instructors from both echelons took part in the conference.

Active Basic Party Organizations Necessary

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Feb 86 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed news report: "Meeting of the POP First Secretaries in Warsaw"]

[Excerpt] The party's position in the plant and community depends above all on the active stances of the POP, on how much the daily work and attitude of POP members are in harmony with the ideals and principles it proclaims.

This idea found its way into most of the speeches made on 22 February during a meeting of the PZPR Warsaw Committee Executive Board conducted with the first secretaries of the Warsaw Province POP's at the PKiN Congress Hall. The meeting carried the slogan "The Strength of the Party in the Activism of Primary Party Organizations."

The working character of this meeting devoted to the directions of work preceding the 10th Congress and to POP tasks was stressed in the method by which it was conducted, as well as in the specific issues raised in the addresses. Before the deliberations opened, secretaries representing more than 3,500 POP's spoke in the corridors with several dozen representatives of the Warsaw Province authorities, the municipal services, the housing cooperative, newspaper, radio and television editorial staffs and other institutions impacting the operation of the urban center and the life of its residents. The "clients" approaching Stanislaw Bielecki, first vice-president of the capital city of Warsaw, were numerous. Several dozen suggestions were made to him, beginning with the need to bring about the improved operation of the administration at the capital-city and city quarter levels through matters requiring specific decisions.

The over 900 discussions yielded many suggestions and proposals, of which some were accepted for immediate implementation and the rest will be examined during the course of the coming month.

PZPR KW First Secretary Janusz Kubasiewicz opened the meeting by pointing to the need for the fuller utilization of such specific experiences of primary party elements in the campaign preceding the 10th Congress.

The party activist is worth as much as he manages to achieve among people. For this reason, the role of the aktiv and all PZPR members in the immediate surroundings was stressed both in the PZPR KW Executive Board report made by

KW Secretary Jerzy Boleslawski and in subsequent speeches. "The manager or the foreman must reckon with our opinions," said Zygmunt Nienaltowski from the Warsaw-Praga PKP Car Barn. "When we withdrew our recommendation for a certain manager and gave it to a comrade that was more worthy of it, the workforce gave its approval of this and our performance of our occupational tasks exceeded plans."

Other speakers likewise referred to the PZPR draft program and stressed the need for strengthening ties with nonparty individuals and for recommending the best of them, especially young people, for the ranks of PZPR candidates.

Politburo candidate member, PZPR CC Secretary Wlodzimierz Mokrzyszczak noted this general social aspect of the pre-congress campaign, stressing the good example of the organizing of nonparty individuals by party groups spoken of by Leon Stepien from the Warsaw II PZL WSK in his statement. In discussing the state of the party 4 months before the congress, the CC secretary noted the political and organizational stabilization of its ranks. He said: "POP activism is primarily the ability to lead people, not only PZPR members. That is why the participation of nonparty individuals in the broad discussion preceding the congress is so important."

Of the over 20 discussants, many raised economic issues in conjunction with the particular proposals of the PZPR draft program.

Politburo member, CC Secretary Marian Wozniak brought up issues of Poland's complex economic situation today, making reference to particular addresses. He noted the basic causes of this situation, such as: the level of our debt to capitalist countries, the still low quality level, the evidence of poor work organization and inefficient management in many enterprises. Poland exports too little. Thus, little can be bought for foreign exchange since interest is paid with the monies that are obtained. At the same time, the market situation, while considerably improved over that of several years ago, does not meet society's need. Inflation can be halted when the wage increase in enterprises is equal to the increase in production quality. Economic reform mechanisms alone are not enough in the process of molding economic awareness. Computers, all the rage of late, cannot replace people in these actions. We need human beings that want, that know and that have character. Party members should be of this sort. POP's must tackle and work to resolve these problems in enterprises.

In summarizing, in addition to discussing POP tasks in the pre-congress campaign, the PZPR KW first secretary emphasized that these organizations must react consistently to all indications of self-complacency. Every party member is obliged to assume a critical attitude, not only to many of the irregularities that occur, but also to himself and his own work.

PZPR CC Politburo member Albin Siwak also took part in the deliberations. During the break, the delegations of participants placed flowers at the Soviet Army Soldiers Cemetery-Mausoleum and before the monument "Fallen in the Service and Defense of People's Poland."

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Warsaw POP Officials' Meeting

[Editorial commentary by: kami]

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 24 Feb 86 p 2

[Text] It does not happen often that the first secretaries of more than 3,000 primary organizations of a Warsaw Party Organization numbering nearly 140,000 members meet in one auditorium. It was necessary and important, and it fostered the activation of the members of the Polish United Workers Party in its primary elements. The meeting likewise proved conclusively how the activism and commitment of party members can have a positive impact on the operation of the economy, not only on the level of particular work stations or plants, but also on the level of the entire Warsaw Province and the state. [It also demonstrated this impact] on the resolution of many daily problems and ills and on the failure to view ostensibly trifling matters as major problems and tragedies.

All the first secretaries that took part in the Warsaw meeting were linked together by a common goal: the preparation of an optimum PZPR program. For this reason, the recommendations and proposals made during the discussion were directed towards the future. True, the discussion was not without its critical, basic evaluation of the negative phenomena that are still taking place around us. The participants in the discussion spoke honestly and openly of the shortcomings of their work, of their subjective and objective causes. However, all this was presented with great concern over the party's future and the good of the state. In the assessment of party activists, such phenomena as the clash between the party's slogans and reality, the failure to keep up with resolving many matters effectively, the arrogance of the administration, the failure to consider the opinions of working people and primary party organizations and departures from party authority resolutions do not foster the growth of the party's authority and that of their party organizations. They also cause incalculable losses in the mental attitudes of party members and nonparty citizens alike. Hence the call for doing decisive and open battle with such practices often made from the meeting platform, a battle that must be waged until the end with consistency.

The Warsaw meeting of PZPR POP first secretaries likewise showed that, regardless of the community in which primary organizations operate--worker, peasant or intellectual--their views, attitudes, concerns and problems are very similar. Thus, a common language was found easily and everyone understood each other very well. This is of especially great importance for the present and future of the party. At the same time, one could not help but notice that during the course of the meeting, it was difficult to discern attitudes of making claims, group attitudes or occupational parochialism. Rather, it was emphasized that although individual interests and ambitions are very deeply justified, they should yield to precedent matters, i.e., setting the Polish economy on a straight road, developing the socialist democracy and creating the proper conditions for leading Poland into the 21st century.

The meeting of POP first secretaries with the PZPR Warsaw Committee Executive Board was only one of the elements in the discussion preceding the 10th Party

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Congress. This discussion already is taking place and not only in party organizations but also among the broad masses of nonparty citizens. Its progress, the wealth of human activism and social initiatives will help the party to prepare a program that will make for a strong, economical and law-abiding Poland.

CC 10th Congress Commission Accepts Draft

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 26 Feb 86 p 1

[Text] On 25 February, the PZPR CC Congress Commission Team for Affairs of Preparing 10th PZPR Congress Theses held deliberations.

The basis for the discussion was the working draft of a document prepared by the Team Presidium, based on recommendations made during the discussion that took place at the team's previous meeting. The Congress Commission Team approved the structure and the basic assumptions of the draft. It stressed the need to link consistently the goals defined in the Party Program draft with the tasks for the next 5-year period contained in the theses.

Economic questions dominated the discussion. The continuation of the economic reform, the implementation of scientific-technical progress, doing decisive and effective battle with inflation, the continued setting in order of the capital spending front and the increase in management efficiency were reckoned among the tasks of special urgency for the coming 5-year period. The team members likewise noted the need for the planned resolution of health care problems and issues of the rationalization of social policy.

Participants in the discussion included: Henryk Cholaj, Antoni Dragan, Andrzej Hoffman, Stefan Jedrychowski, Jan Kaczmarek, Pawel Kaminski, Franciszek Kubiczek, Marek Kuczynski, Jan Laskowski, Wladyslaw Loranc, Edmund Michalik, Zbigniew Michalek, Walerian Solinski, Eugeniusz Stawinski, Jerzy Swiderski and Andrzej Wietrzykowski.

Participants in the deliberations included CC Politburo member Albin Siwak and CC Secretary Zbigniew Michalek. Politburo member, CC Secretary Marian Wozniak chaired the deliberations.

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SD CC PRESIDUM ON PZPR DRAFT PROGRAM

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Mar 86 p 2

[PAP article, "Presidium of the SD Central Committee"]

[Text] On 4 March the Presidium of the SD Central Committee discussed the sociopolitical situation of the country. It was pointed out that members of the SD, replying to an invitation by their allies, had overwhelmingly joined the national debate concerning the PZPR program.

The discussion among the [Democratic] party rank and file will cover the entire spectrum of problems connected with Poland's future, focusing on problems of intelligentsia participation in the country's life, and on the development problems of small producers, culture, and environment protection.

The Central Committee Presidium pointed out that members of the [Democratic] party have closely followed the party debate among Soviet communists. The attention paid by the world to the debates of the CPSU 28th Congress induces the belief that the constructive peace proposals of the USSR would find many new followers.

The presidium discussed the premises of the country's urban development till 1995, and took acquaintance of the prognosed demographical situation in Poland.

The Presidium listened to a report on preparations toward the 3rd Congress of Polish Science, and on [Democratic] party members' contribution.

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POLITICS

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WRITERS UNION HOSTS PZPR PRIMARY ORGANIZATION

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Mar 86 p 2

[PAP article, "On the Eve of the 10th PZPR Congress: Discussion in the Writers Community"]

[Text] Problems of cultural, and in particular literary, development were the main topic of discussion in the PZPR primary organization at the Warsaw branch of the Polish Writers Union. It has opened a discussion in the writers community, which precedes the 10th PZPR Congress. Writers, non-members of the party organization, also participated in the meeting.

The debate was introduced by pronouncements of Michal Misiorny on the PZPR draft program, and of Professor Jerzy Adamski on the programmatic theses on the development of Polish culture. Barbara Nawrocka-Donska, Eugeniusz Banaszczyk, Ryszard Frelek, Zofia Bystrzycka, Roman Samsel, and Romuald Karas took the floor.

Problems raised during the debate were discussed by Waldemar Swirgon, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee. Referring to the PZPR draft program, he pointed out that all the documents prepared for the congress have taken into account the complicated situation our country goes through. They sum up our accomplishments, and at the same time they indicate the targets we have to reach. They also provide justification for the route the party had chosen. The debate was chaired by Zygmunt Wojcik, first secretary of the primary party organization; it was attended by Witold Nawrocki, head of the Department of Culture at the Central Committee.

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POLITICS

POLAND

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORTS ON STATE OF LAW

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8-9 Mar 86 p 2

[PAP article, "Report on the State of Law: The Prime Minister Granted an Audience to the Presidium of the Legislative Council"]

[Text] On 7 March Prime Minister Zbigniew Messner met with the enlarged Presidium of the Legislative Council. The prime minister was given a report on the state of law, prepared by the council. It was a second document of that kind in the history of the PPR.

A large group of scholars and practitioners had to be involved in the endeavor of preparing a multifaced assessment of law. Thanks to their efforts, a 200 page-long report was prepared, supplemented by 7 volumes dedicated to different branches of law. The entire enterprise not only synthetically informs about the state of law now in force, but also attempts to set down directions for its improvement. It not only diagnoses but also determines tasks derived from the complicated socioeconomic and political situation of our state.

The report deals with analysis and assessment of problems of constitutional law, civil law, regulation of labor conditions, social insurance, agriculture, economy, and finances. It contains suggestions concerning legal policy, extra-legal conditions necessary for the improved quality of law and its increased efficiency, and improvement of the legislative process.

Zbigniew Messner conveyed his gratitude to the council for the effort devoted in the preparation of the report. He pointed out that it has earned even more respect because the entire full-scale enterprise was completed in less than a year and a half. The prime minister said that the report will be of great help for governmental activities; it will be helpful in constructing the program of legislative activities, both in the near and in the more remote future. He rated highly the council's accomplishments in expressing its opinion about draft laws and other legal documents. Such opinions have brought major support to the government.

Members of the council's presidium discussed the future tasks of the council and raised up some problems which rankle the legal community. In the final part of the meeting, the prime minister warmly thanked the outgoing chairman, Professor Sylwester Zawadzki, for his leadership in the council. Prof.

Zawadzki had resigned his functions in view of his appointment as member of the Council of State. The prime minister handed the nomination act to the new chairman of the Legislative Council, Professor Zbigniew Radwanski, an eminent scholar in civil law at the Adam Mickiewicz University at Poznan.

The Legislative Council, it should be noted, is a non-official consultative body of the chairman of the Council of Ministers. It is composed of 40 eminent lawyers, who represent both scholarship and legal practice. Some 60 scholars, drawn from all the academic centers, systematically cooperate with the council within the framework of its specialized groups.

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POLITICS

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PUBLIC COMMEMORATION OF 1944 WARSAW UPRISING PLANNED

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Mar 86 p 5

[Summary] The Public Committee for the Construction of 'The Heroes of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising' Memorial met in conference on 16 March 86 to summarize the work of the preceeding year and decide on work that needs to be done in the future. The participants presented another version of the memorial and described the reconstruction of Krasinski Square where, in two years, an obelisk commemorating the Uprising will stand. Wincenty Kucma has been named project designer and his proposal thus far has received the approval of many groups of former insurgents as well as of art experts. An exhibit is planned for May 86 which will present these proposals to the public. The Public Committee for the Memorial's Construction is now considering ways to increase the material provisions needed for this purpose, including auctions and concerts to raise funds. The memorial is scheduled for unveiling on 1 August 88, the 44th anniversary of the uprising.

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